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INTRODUCTION
Globalization has produced a mongrelized, hybrid, and heterogeneous reality that
transcends national territory. For example, in today’s globalized world, corporate
products are frequently globally sourced and produced. “A Pontiac Le Mans, osten-
sibly a General Motors product of American nationality, is in fact a globally com-
posite product involving South Korean assembly; Japanese engines, transaxles and
electronics; German design and style engineering; Taiwanese, Singaporean, and
Japanese small components; British advertising and marketing; and Irish and Bar-
badian data processing.”1 Is this an American product or not? “Products appear to
be made everywhere and also nowhere in particular, as shown on the following com-
puter circuit label: ‘Made in one or more of the following countries: Korea, Hong
Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Mauritius, Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, Philip-
pines. The exact country of origin is unknown.’”2
Even national governance has become more hybridized under the influence of
the forces of globalization.3 The domestic autonomy of states must now contend
* Professor Cao is the Betty Hutton Williams Professor of International Economic Law
at the Fowler School of Law. She joined the Fowler School of Law in 2013 after serving for
more than a decade on the faculty at William & Mary Law School, where she was Boyd Fellow
and Professor of Law. She clerked for Judge Constance Baker Motley of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York. She also practiced in the litigation and corporate depart-
ments of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison in New York City. Professor Cao was a
Ford Foundation Scholar in 1991. She has published scholarly articles in the area of inter-
national trade and finance, international economic development, and finance and culture in law.
She is also the author of several books, including an academic monograph called CULTURE IN
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: NURTURING POSITIVE CHANGE (Oxford University Press 2015); as
well as two novels, MONKEY BRIDGE (Viking Penguin 1997) and THE LOTUS AND THE STORM
(Viking Penguin 2014), both set against the backdrop of the Vietnam War.
1 Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy: Rethinking U.S.
Trade Laws, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 401, 432 (2002).
2 Id. at 403.
3 See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZA-
TION 28 (1996) (“The state itself has been a key agent in the implementation of global processes,
and it has emerged quite altered by this participation.”); Eric C. Ip, Globalization and the Future
of the Law of the Sovereign State, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 636, 638 (2010) (“[I]t is largely uncon-
troversial to suggest that globalization has exerted an immense impact on the sovereign state.”);
see generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999); THOMAS L.
FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (updated & expanded ed. 2006) (discussing the reach and
rapid impact of globalization on states).
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with exogenous pressures from international norms and forces, such as human rights
laws, international trade and capital markets, international organizations, and other
markers of the new international order.4 As the price of membership in the globalized
world order, states are responsible for providing a growing list of public goods for
their populations, such as security, health and education, and infrastructure, among
others.5 A state’s failure to provide one or more of these public goods impacts the
overall quality of life for its people and its level of economic development.6 In an in-
tensely networked world, such failure can lead to public shaming at the international
level, even if traditional state sovereignty protects governments from accountability.7
Not surprisingly, states have become more willing to look for creative solutions
for the delivery of public goods, even at the expense of conceding some aspects of
domestic autonomy. A number of governments have turned to public-private partner-
ships for large projects, partnering with foreign contractors to complete infrastruc-
ture projects that were previously undertaken wholly by the public sector.8 In such
partnerships, multinational enterprises (MNEs), nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), development agencies, or other private actors collaborate with the state to
meet the demand for public goods.9
In the BOT (build, operate, transfer) or BOOT (build, own, operate, transfer)
models of public-private partnerships, the state provides the land on which the domes-
tic or foreign private partners finance, develop, construct, market, and operate the
infrastructure.10 The private parties then transfer the facilities to the government after
a set period of time, typically ranging from twenty to ninety-nine years.11 However,
4 See SASSEN, supra note 3, at 29 (“Sovereignty remains a feature of the [international]
system, but it is now located in a multiplicity of institutional arenas: the new emergent trans-
national private legal regimes, new supranational organizations (such as the WTO and the institu-
tions of the European Union) and the various international rights codes. All these institutions
constrain the autonomy of national states; states operating under the rule of law are caught
in a web of obligations they cannot disregard easily . . . .”); Ip, supra note 3, at 639 (“Complex
economic, humanitarian, health, and environmental problems no longer heed the artificial
boundaries imposed by states” as the “state is ‘obliged’ to share power with other groups
within complicated, multilayered networks of political power”).
5 See Mansour Esmaeil Zaei, Globalization of National Policy-Making: An International
Perspective, 13 PUB. POL’Y ADMIN. 331, 331–32 (2014).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 David A. Levy, BOT and Public Procurement: A Conceptual Framework, 7 IND. INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 95, 95–96 (1996).
9 BARBARA WEBER, MIRJAM STAUB-BISANG & HANS WILHELM ALFEN, INFRASTRUCTURE
AS AN ASSET CLASS: INVESTMENT STRATEGY, SUSTAINABILITY, PROJECT FINANCE AND PPP
87–89 (2d ed. 2016).
10 Andrew B. Wyatt, The Privatisation of Public Infrastructure in Transitional Southeast
Asian Economies, in COLLECTIVE GOODS, COLLECTIVE FUTURES IN ASIA 122–24 (Sally
Sargeson ed., 2002).
11 Id.
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during the concession period, the facilities and land are no longer fully within the
state’s domestic autonomy.12
There are numerous examples of BOT or BOOT projects worldwide. For instance,
Hong Kong’s Western Harbor Crossing is owned by a private consortium for a thirty-
year concession period.13 India has entered into numerous BOT road-construction
projects with foreign partners.14 Vietnam has contracted with Japanese firm Marubeni
and the state-owned South Korean utilities provider, Korea Electric Power, to con-
struct a thermal power plant.15
Public services can also be globally sourced. In a growing worldwide trend,
governments are outsourcing the delivery of many services by engaging in transna-
tional public-private partnerships. In Nigeria, private schools have flourished as a
response to the inadequacy of government-provided education.16 In Kenya and Uganda,
hybrid NGOs and private businesses are working together to deliver electricity to
areas not covered by the governments.17 Such transnational partnerships transform
governance by interjecting their own rules and regulations into the host country as
a kind of “soft law.”18 As a result of these transnational partnerships, local government
law is perforated by international influences and values brought in by foreign partners.
In the globalized world, state sovereignty and domestic autonomy have become
hollowed out by international partnerships and influences.
It is not just products and services that are globally sourced with multiple origins;
even cities and territories can reflect this modern reality. We tend to think of cities as
entities within sovereign nation-states with laws passed by legislatures at the national,
state, and local level. But there are startup or charter cities that challenge, for better
or for worse, this national-international boundary, and are instead mongrelized,
12 Id.
13 UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON, PROJECT PROFILE: HONG KONG, WEST HARBOUR CROSS-
ING 39 (2014); C. M. Tam, Build-Operate-Transfer Model for Infrastructure Developments in
Asia: Reasons for Successes and Failures, 17 INT’L J. PROJECT MGMT. 377, 377–82 (1999).
14 See generally Satyanarayan N. Kalidindi & L. Boeing Singh, Financing Road Projects
in India Using PPP Scheme, Proceedings of the 2009 Mid-Continent Transportation Research
Symposium, INST. TRANSP. IOWA. ST. U. (2009) (discussing the efficiencies and benefits of
PPPs in upgrading India’s road network).
15 Atsushi Tomiyama, Vietnam to Ask Marubeni with Help Constructing $2.5bn Thermal
Plant, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (Nov. 8, 2017), https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Vietnam-to-ask-Maru
beni-with-help-constructing-2.5bn-thermal-plant [https://perma.cc/4VCH-SG32].
16 Danielle Carter Kushner, Lauren M. MacLean & Jeffery W. Paller, Do Public Goods
Have to Be Public? Not in Some African Countries, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/09/23/five-things-you-should-know
-about-the-politics-of-public-goods-in-africa/?utm_term=.9dabc4d34162 [https://perma.cc
/FX5X-44YA].
17 Id.
18 Andrea Liese & Marianne Beisheim, Transnational Public-Private Partnerships and the
Provision of Collective Goods in Developing Countries, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT A STATE?
POLICIES AND POLITICS IN AREAS OF LIMITED STATEHOOD 115, 117 (Thomas Risse ed., 2011).
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hybrid, and heterogeneous. For example, Madagascar explored unconventional ways
of attracting foreign investment, leasing a large tract of land on its territory to Daewoo,
a South Korean corporation, for ninety-nine years.19 Daewoo, and Madagascar’s
neighbor Mauritius (acting as trustee), would administer the export-processing zone
on Malagasy territory.20 Although the deal did not go through because the President
of Madagascar was ousted in a coup, it nonetheless represented the concept of the
public-private sector—a national-international partnership using innovative, but con-
troversial, arrangements to jump-start economic development.21
In recent years, cities have become innovative global actors participating in the
international arena in their own right, even as they retain their subordinate status
within the nation. For example, the cities of New York, Houston, Miami, and San
Francisco committed to the goals of the Paris agreement despite the United State’s
national decision to withdraw in 2017.22 London, New York, and Tokyo are well
established as “world cities” that serve as international economic actors and com-
mand centers of the global economy.23 For such world cities, international influences
compete with national laws as the cities adopt objectives of “best practices” or
“good governance models.”24 According to Professors Gerald Frug and David
Barron, the incremental transformation of cities, especially world cities, into interna-
tional actors has given rise to the hybrid entity of the “private city,” where the
objective of private economic development drives city power.25
Some scholars have argued that public land and sovereign functions should be
viewed as commodities in an international market.26 At the height of the Greek debt
crisis, two German MPs gave an interview in which they suggested that Greece sell
some of its islands and the Acropolis to reduce its debt.27 Although the proposal was
19 Song Jung-a, Christian Oliver & Tom Burgis, Daewoo to Cultivate Madagascar Land
for Free, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/6e894c6a-b65c-11dd-89dd
-0000779fd18c [https://perma.cc/HMJ5-MP25].
20 Sebastian Mallaby, The Politically Incorrect Guide to Ending Poverty, ATLANTIC
(July/Aug. 2010), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/07/the-politically-in
correct-guide-to-ending-poverty/308134 [https://perma.cc/F5D8-N5S3].
21 See id.
22 Oliver Milman, Richard Luscombe & Tom Dart, The Fight Against Climate Change: Four
Cities Leading the Way in the Trump Era, GUARDIAN (June 12, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www
.theguardian.com/cities/2017/jun/12/climate-change-trump-new-york-city-san-francisco
-houston-miami [https://perma.cc/Q4NU-SK2F].
23 Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron, International Local Government Law, 38 URB. LAW.
1, 8–9 (2006).
24 Id. at 3–4.
25 Id. at 4.
26 Joseph Blocher, Selling State Borders, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 241, 243 (2014).
27 Nicole Itano, Germans to Debt-Ridden Greeks: Sell the Acropolis. And a Few Islands,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 4, 2010), https://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2010/0304
/Germans-to-debt-ridden-Greeks-Sell-the-Acropolis.-And-a-few-islands [https://perma.cc
/GL4T-Z6EZ].
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rejected as an attempt to humiliate the nation,28 the idea of selling sovereignty is not
new. Professor Joseph Blocher points out that the Louisiana Purchase, Alaska Pur-
chase, and Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo shaped the United States through the sale
of territory.29 During the Cold War, developing nations conceded aspects of state
sovereignty in exchange for foreign aid dollars or protection from a superpower.30
Today, market transactions for aspects of sovereignty are commonplace. For example,
Taiwan provides foreign aid to countries that grant it official recognition.31
Along this continuum described above, in recent years, a relatively well-worn
concept, Special Economic Zones (SEZs), have reemerged and have been catapulted
into the discourse on economic development and rule of law projects.32 Building on
the concept of SEZs popularized by China’s experiment with Shenzhen, the economist
Paul Romer has been credited by some with developing a new theory in development
economics known as “Charter Cities.”33 Charter Cities are essentially hyperkinetic
variants of the old SEZs.34 SEZs generally refer to special geographic areas in a
country that have been set aside for special economic regulations, different from those
that apply to the rest of the country.35 These areas are designed to attract foreign
investment or create conditions deemed most conducive to economic development
and growth.36 Proponents of charter cities consider such entities to be a kind of “mega
SEZ” that functions as a “private micro-state.”37
28 Simon Shuster, Greece May Have to Sell Islands and Ruins Under Its Bailout Deal, TIME
(July 13, 2015), http://time.com/3956017/greece-bailout-selloff [https://perma.cc/5M43-R7ZR].
29 See Blocher, supra note 26, at 245–46.
30 Daniel W. Drezner, Sovereignty for Sale, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 18, 2009, 6:20 PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/18/sovereignty-for-sale [https://perma.cc/D9QG-UAA7].
31 Id.
32 See generally WORLD BANK, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: AN OPERATIONAL REVIEW OF
THEIR IMPACTS (2017) (explaining the impact of Special Economic Zones).
33 Carlo Dade, Foreword to BRANDON FULLER & PAUL ROMER, SUCCESS AND THE CITY:
HOW CHARTER CITIES COULD TRANSFORM THE DEVELOPING WORLD at i (The MacDonald-
Laurier Institute 2012), https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/How-charter-cities-could
-transform-the-developing-world-April-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RV5-YGF4] (“While the
idea is not new in the sense of never having been seen, it is new in the sense of uncovering the
importance and potential of something that has been overlooked.”). For a critique of Romer’s
ideas, see Aditya Chakrabortty, Paul Romer Is a Brilliant Economist—But His Idea for Charter
Cities Is Bad, GUARDIAN (July 27, 2010, 2:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/science
/2010/jul/27/paul-romers-charter-cities-idea [https://perma.cc/TU8H-FZZU] (“Romer’s right,
in a way. This idea isn’t prompted by dreams of a new imperialism—because this California
economist doesn’t know enough imperial history.”).
34 Dade, supra note 33, at i–ii.
35 WORLD BANK, supra note 32, at 1–2.
36 Id.
37 Brian Hutchinson, Year in Ideas: Professor Touts Special Economic Zones Known as
“Charter Cities”, NAT’L POST (Dec. 27, 2012, 10:17 AM), http://nationalpost.com/news/year
-in-ideas-professor-touts-special-economic-zones-known-as-charter-cities [https://perma.cc
/TG65-YTAJ].
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As a special reform zone, the charter city “extends the concept of a special
economic zone by increasing its size to the scale of a city and expanding the scope
of its reforms.”38 To appeal to investors, the charter city would function as:
a tax-free, special reform zone that would attract millions of
opportunity-seekers from the developing world. Most would be
employed in factories, at least initially. Everyone would receive
basic services and enjoy universal rights and freedoms. All
infrastructure—including schools and hospitals—would be owned
and operated by private investors and developers.39
A recent example is Honduras, in which a large area of mostly uninhabited land
along the coast would be set aside and designated as a special region called a Región
Especial de Desarrollo (RED).40 These “special development regions” would be gov-
erned by a newly created legal framework under which a charter city could be created.41
Honduran reformers pushed for the formation of REDs, offering low taxes, good
governance, a streamlined regulatory environment, and safeguards against political
interference.42 The vision was for a robust city of ten million, built from scratch and
thus not constrained by weak institutions, old paths (referred to as path dependency),
old frameworks, or old rules.43 The REDs were to have flexibility and far-reaching
authority to experiment with principles of public administration, commercial law,
common law courts, and police forces.44 They never took off because the Honduran
Supreme Court held that REDs constituted an unconstitutional abrogation of Honduran
sovereignty and territorial integrity.45
But the general idea remains appealing and has gone through a few incarnations.
In 2013, Honduras announced new plans to build a port in Amapala, a customs zone,
and processing plants for exports.46 These projects would all be financed by private
investors lured by the prospect of “employment and economic development zones”
38 BRANDON FULLER & PAUL ROMER, SUCCESS AND THE CITY: HOW CHARTER CITIES
COULD TRANSFORM THE DEVELOPING WORLD 3 (The MacDonald-Laurier Institute 2012).
39 Hutchinson, supra note 37.
40 FULLER & ROMER, supra note 38, at 1.
41 Id.
42 TOM W. BELL, YOUR NEXT GOVERNMENT? FROM THE NATION STATE TO STATELESS NA-
TIONS 50 (2018) [hereinafter BELL, YOUR NEXT GOVERNMENT?].
43 Hutchinson, supra note 37.
44 Tom W. Bell, No Exit: Are Honduran Free Cities DOA?, FOUND. ECON. EDUC. (Nov. 26,
2012), https://fee.org/articles/no-exit-are-honduran-free-cities-doa [https://perma.cc/8XAQ
-WCRK] [hereinafter Bell, No Exit].
45 Id.
46 Honduras Experiments with Charter Cities, ECONOMIST (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www
.economist.com/the-americas/2017/08/12/honduras-experiments-with-charter-cities [https://
perma.cc/22R4-THKG] [hereinafter ECONOMIST, Honduras Experiments with Charter Cities].
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(ZEDEs), whose reach and scope would be much more ambitious than that of con-
ventional SEZs.47 The Amapala ZEDE would function as an “independent jurisdic-
tion[ ] with [its] own laws, courts and police.”48 The ZEDE charter city would “have
its own political, judicial, economic and administrative system based on free market
capitalism in running its own eight sectors¯logistics, business courts, service sectors,
renewable energy, commerce, agriculture, tourism and mining.”49 This is a radical
concept—a city, backed by foreign investors, built on Honduran territory not as
Honduran entities, but rather quasi-sovereign entities, like city-states—with admin-
istrative autonomy and governed by international or best-practices rules.50
Honduras is considering proposals for additional ZEDEs, and as of August 2017,
its government has signed more than ten memoranda of understanding with investors.51
Many projects are development-ready, meaning land has been bought and trans-
ferred to the investor group, maps drawn and investment capital raised.52 Proposals
being considered may include smaller projects, such as call centers, and larger projects,
some as large as an entire city.53 As an example of the latter, the Honduran government
is launching a tourism-related ZEDE project that will encompass several existing
fishing villages, factories, and a customs center.54 Some other ZEDEs are to be part
of a so-called master plan drawn by the global consultancy firm McKinsey.55 These
plans include creating 600,000 jobs by enacting private rules that would lure vehicle
assembly, call centers, and other industries from Asia.56 As of October 2017, eight inter-
national businesses—Energy Transfer, Port Royal, Lacthosa, Emco Group, Lamericom,
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Yi Whan-woo, Honduras Takes Korea as Economic Model, KOREA TIMES (July 11,
2014), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2014/07/178_160821.html [https://
perma.cc/N4QQ-8J2T].
50 Maya Kroth, Under New Management, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 1, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://
foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/01/under-new-management [https://perma.cc/8VKD-XMY8]. Other
experiments may allow a different kind of hybrid reality—not necessarily premised on a large-
scale charter city like the Honduras proposal in which a city will be managed, controlled, and
governed by international rather than national rules. More limited but innovative experiments
abound in which special zones are exempt from the uniformity of national laws and regulations
in a way that proponents claim increase jurisdictional competition and wealth. See, e.g., About
Foreign-Trade Zones and Contact Info, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (May 29,
2018), https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security/cargo-control/foreign
-trade-zones/about [https://perma.cc/U59J-8WBR]. In the United States, for example, Foreign
Trade Zones which are often located near ports of entry, function essentially as free-trade zones
where certain commercial merchandise are exempt from tariffs and other ad valorem tax. Id.
51 ECONOMIST, Honduras Experiments with Charter Cities, supra note 46.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
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Dong Ju, Rapton Minning, and Wonder Foods—have formally expressed interest in
the ZEDE arrangement.57 The idea is that the charter cities will institute a framework
that appeals to investors because it can override or bypass everything business-
unfriendly about the local environment—bad laws, bad practices, bad norms, bad
institutions, and bad infrastructure—that had shackled development in the past.58 Ac-
cording to the ZEDE’s law, ninety percent of the charter city zone’s workers must be
Honduran nationals and must receive eighty-five percent of all wages.59
Honduras has the highest murder rate in the world and sixty-five percent of its
people live in poverty.60 This dire situation—economic free fall, natural disasters,
violence, and political instability—has meant mass migration of Hondurans fleeing
distress and dysfunction at home.61 For example, by 2000, the number of illegal
Honduran migrants in the United States had doubled from a decade earlier—to
283,000—and as of 2014, stood at around 500,000.62 It is hoped that a city operating
under foreign supervision and presumably better rules would make it easier to attract
investment and establish security, and for rich countries, to stem the flow of hun-
dreds of thousands of unwanted migrants into their territory.63 Given the crime rate
and corruption level in Honduras, it is possible that private security firms will be relied
upon to protect the population in charter cities established there.64 Alternatively, if the
host country—in this case, Honduras—were to partner with a developed, foreign-
country partner, most of “the services could be provided by fee. For example, if
Canada were a partner nation, the city could pay the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
to provide police training for the city’s new law enforcement organs.”65
57 Honduran Employment Zones Draw Interest from International Businesses, CISION PR
NEWSWIRE (Oct. 26, 2017, 5:53 PM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/honduran
-employment-zones-draw-interest-from-international-businesses-300544566.html [https://
perma.cc/GD2T-XAFY].
58 See Kroth, supra note 50.
59 Id.
60 Jordana Timerman, What Would It Be Like to Live in a Town Run by Investors?, CITYLAB
(Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2014/10/what-would-it-be-like-to-live-in-a-town
-run-by-investors/381532 [https://perma.cc/VUG5-ZVH4].
61 Randal C. Archibold, Hope Dwindles for Hondurans Living in Peril, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2,
2014), https://nyti.ms/1oj6CSu.
62 Id.
63 Hong Kong in Honduras, ECONOMIST (Dec. 10, 2011), https://www.economist.com/in
ternational/2011/12/10/hong-kong-in-honduras [https://perma.cc/2YAP-KQ6K] [hereinafter
ECONOMIST, Hong Kong in Honduras].
64 Id. (“Honduras is one of the world’s more corrupt countries, in 129th place out of 183
in a survey of outsiders’ perceptions by Transparency International, a Berlin-based lobby group.
It also has the region’s highest murder rate.”).
65 Michael R. Castle Miller, The Ciudades Modelo Project: Testing the Legality of Paul
Romer’s Charter Cities Concept by Analyzing the Constitutionality of the Honduran Zones
for Employment and Economic Development, 22 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 271,
276–77 (2015).
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Under the charter-city model, swaths of land would be ceded to international in-
vestors, and developed into autonomous cities, replete with their own police forces,
taxes, labor codes, trade rules, and legal systems.66 Advocates believe that such cities
are needed to sidestep the stranglehold of vested interests, inefficiency, bad law, and
corruption.67 The United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, and Singapore could be viewed
as startups that coaxed foreign investment in ways that bettered the lives of the
people who lived there.68 In the United Arab Emirates, “Dubai created a number of
micro-cities—one of which, for instance, is governed by a system resembling English
common law with judges from Britain, Singapore and New Zealand.”69
Charter cities are particularly appealing in rapidly urbanizing countries because
they can be used as a catalyst for fast-track change. A charter city can be analogized
to a civic startup, allowing different societies to experiment with new rules without
the imposition of new layers of bureaucratic regulation on pre-existing regulation.
Poor countries tend to be “saddled with laws and, crucially, customs that prevent
new ideas from taking shape.”70 Such countries can either “undo their invidious
systems (corruption, oppression of minorities, bureaucracy) and create an environ-
ment more conducive to business. Or they could just start from scratch.”71
Hong Kong often has been invoked as a model. Although in some ways it is an
apt example, using Hong Kong as a model has unnecessarily injected a neocolonial
whiff into the debate. It is true that the British used gunboat diplomacy to wrest
Hong Kong from China and ruled the city as colonial overseers. However, in the
process, the British established a model economic enclave governed by a newly
instituted charter, informed by, economically speaking, enlightened rules: low taxes,
minimal regulations, rule-of-law protection for property, and contract rights, for
example.72 It is also true, however, that in an attempt to institute market reforms in
the 1980s, China copied Hong Kong and initiated its own Hong Kong–like enclave
in Shenzhen, proving that Hong Kong’s appeal extended beyond its colonial origin
and could be replicated elsewhere.73
China created copycat Hong Kongs first in the nearby city of Shenzhen, and
then in other special economic zones (SEZs) along the western and northern parts of
the Pacific coast, unleashing a great export boom that lifted an estimated 100 million
66 See id. (explaining the benefits of an autonomous charter city).
67 Adam Davidson, Who Wants to Buy Honduras?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 8, 2012), https://
nyti.ms/2vkaXjD.
68 See id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See Mallaby, supra note 20.
73 Paul Romer, Interview on Urbanization, Charter Cities and Growth Theory, PAUL
ROMER (Apr. 29, 2015), https://paulromer.net/interview-on-urbanization-charter-cities-and
-growth-threory/index.html [https://perma.cc/6M39-W74P].
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Chinese above the one-dollar-a-day subsistence.74 Shenzhen, once only a small
market town in the Pearl River Delta, was created pursuant to Deng Xiao Ping’s
policy of “reform and opening,” established in late 1979.75 It was chosen to be a SEZ
because of its proximity to Hong Kong, serving as an experimental laboratory for
the institution of market capitalism or “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”76 Its
spectacular success allowed Deng to continue his open-door policy despite vocifer-
ous resistance from conservative segments of the Communist Party.77 Deng Xiao
Ping favored SEZs because of their efficiency.78 They allowed him to open up the
Chinese economy without “long argument and contention about what types of change
to pursue and how to pursue them.”79 The success of Shenzhen also allowed Deng
to accelerate and expand reform into other parts of the country.80 As the economist
Paul Romer, who first proposed that charter cities be seriously studied, stated: “In
a sense, Britain inadvertently, through its actions in Hong Kong, did more to reduce
world poverty than all the aid programs that we’ve undertaken in the last century.”81
Even after British handover in 1999, Hong Kong retained its autonomy under
the principle of “one country, two systems.”82 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China delineates the
special relationship Hong Kong has with China, allowing it to function as an enclave
with property rights and other liberal market policies.83 Nonetheless, whether or not
Hong Kong is summoned as an example, the notion that developing countries would
set up special administrative zones—to be run by foreign technocrats as managers
and controlled by shareholders and a board of directors—inevitably evokes charges
of neocolonialism. Instead of colonial officials, the new overlords would be multina-
tional or corporate technocrats versed in the language of economic efficiency and
rule of law.84
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But in reality, charter or startup cities, or special zones, can be formed anywhere
and to accomplish myriad objectives, not just to maximize economic efficiency and
attract foreign investment. Indeed, they can be set up not just in developing countries
but “in any country that wants to implement reforms, even a developed country like
the United States.”85 The state of California, for example, has allowed the establish-
ment of charter cities since the 1870s, when it amended its constitution during a time
of economic crisis to grant municipalities more “freedom to set their own rules about
elections, salaries and contracts.”86 In some cases, this has meant great flexibility and
exemption from certain state-imposed rules, such as prevailing union rates, state-
mandated salary limits, or limits on city layoffs of its employees, sometimes resulting
in success and other times not.87 It has also been suggested that starting a new charter
city today in the United States could result in different kinds of beneficial innovation.88
For example, a new charter city could implement a new transportation system that
would not be feasible in an established city, such as requiring that all vehicles be
computer-controlled, autonomous vehicles.89
Differences in economic, historical, political, and cultural contexts might result in
different types of charter cities with different objectives. For example, on March 4,
1681, William Penn was granted a charter by King Charles II of England to experi-
ment with a then-radical new concept of religious freedom.90 The grant was made
to repay a debt the King owed Penn’s father, an admiral in the British Navy.91 The
tract granted to Penn was 45,000 square miles of land, almost as large as England.92
Penn named the capital the “City of Brotherly Love” in order “to reflect his desire
that his colony serve as a haven for Quakers and other oppressed Christians seeking
religious freedom,” such as “French Huguenots, English and Irish Catholics,
Lutherans from Catholic German states, Swiss Amish, German Mennonites.”93 Penn
sought the consent of Lenape chiefs, seeking permission “to enjoy the land with your
love and consent so that we may always live together as neighbors and friends” and
Colonialism: A General Characterization, 11–13 (Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Paper
No. 29974, 2011), http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29974/1/MPRA_paper_29974.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GJ9T-MP2T] (examining similarities and differences between colonialism and
Romer’s charter cities).
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86 Tamara Audi, Bobby White & Max Taves, California’s ‘Charter’ Cities Are Under
the Microscope, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2012, 11:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1
0001424052702303612804577531181167707276 [https://perma.cc/23JL-F6H3].
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signed a treaty under a large tree at the Shackamaxon.94 Penn’s zone could be viewed
as a charter city designed to engage in a “Holy Experiment,” one whose founding
document “Voltaire called the ‘only treaty between the Indian nations and the Chris-
tians that was not ratified by oath, and was never broken’ at least in Penn’s lifetime.”95
A different objective for a charter city could very well be environmentalism and
sustainable development. With a growing middle class in China interested in clean
air, one could imagine the establishment of a new city in China that would compete
for residents by offering the cleanest air. The city’s charter could ban diesel fuel, coal,
or the combustion of all liquid and solid fuel. It could also allow only nuclear, wind,
solar power, or natural gas as fuel sources. This could be done “without having to
have in place a very intrusive and complicated system of regulation and inspection
of individual cars like the one we use in the United States.”96
Currently, different charter cities are being formed for vastly different purposes.
For example, Agile Solutions, a Brazilian software firm, is planning the construction
of a $200 million “startup village” in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, which would serve as
a “‘blank slate,’ which the company could use as a laboratory for new approaches
to health care, education and tax.”97 Similarly, a different form of public-private
partnership ZEDE is being considered which would involve the creation of an “energy
district” in Olancho, with the participation of Canadian investors to harvest wood
for fuel.98 The scale of the ZEDE is projected to be massive—reaching an area
constituting eight percent of Honduras with a population of 380,000 people; health
care and education for this area is to be provided by HOI, a Christian NGO based
in the United States.99
A charter-city-like concept, dubbed “free havens,” has also been suggested to
address the global refugee crisis.100 Under international law, refugees have the right
to leave war-torn countries, but few countries are willing to accept them.101 Conse-
quently, many languish in refugee camps under tight restrictions and control of the
host countries.102 Long-term refugee camps have become an entrenched reality in many
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Romer, supra note 73.
97 ECONOMIST, Honduras Experiments with Charter Cities, supra note 46.
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100 Alexander Betts, Is Creating a New Nation for the World’s Refugees a Good Idea?,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 4, 2015, 7:33 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-pro
fessionals-network/2015/aug/04/refugee-nation-migration-jason-buzi [https://perma.cc/WVC8
-LTBL]; Pieter Cleppe, “Start Up Cities” for Refugees: A Long-Term Solution to the Migration
Crisis?, CAPX (July 28, 2016), https://capx.co/start-up-cities-for-refugees-a-long-term-solu
tion-to-the-refugee-crisis [https://perma.cc/H845-W2NB].
101 Dara Lind, The Right to Asylum: Why Europe Has to Take in People Fleeing Perse-
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parts of the world where millions of people are stuck, even as many countries in the
developed world increasingly lack the desire and political will to accept the ever-
growing numbers of refugees globally.103 For example, the more than 100,000
Burmese refugees living in Thailand are prohibited from leaving their camps, subject
to travel and work constraints, and dependent on external help via the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for basic needs.104 Similarly, Lebanon’s “more than 470,000
Palestinian refugees, of whom over 50 percent live in twelve refugee camps,”105 are
faced with all kinds of restrictions—by law, Palestinians cannot become Lebanese
citizens, nor can they inherit property or pursue certain professions.106 They are not
subject to the Lebanese governance system and instead are entangled in the labyrinth
of various Palestinian factions who exercise de jure and de facto authority.107
Free havens could be formed to provide refugees with not only camps where
they are warehoused, but also territorial zones where there is the promise of the rule
of law as well as economic investment and opportunities. Some have called Hong
Kong a refugee zone, subject to British rule of law, and for years, a haven for those
seeking to escape mainland China’s totalitarian rule.108 Uninhabited land, even in
more remote areas of a state, could be set aside as free havens for refugees. There
is enough underdeveloped land in the world that, according to Jason Buzi, the
proponent of Refuge Nations, it should not be politically infeasible to house twenty
million refugees in a world of more than seven billion people.109 The aim involves
a “rethinking of the political geography of asylum”110 using a concept that has also
been referred to as a Refugee Nation: “buy an under-populated area of land some-
where in the world and turn it into a territory for the world’s refugees to begin a new
life.”111 Proponents argue that a drastic solution is needed to address the global refugee
crisis and that the solution lies in abandoning the current framework, because “NGOs
and international bodies are financially beholden to the current system, even if it is
failing and the situation is clearly getting worse.”112
103 Id.
104 See Alisa Tang, After 30 Years in Thailand, a Glimmer of Hope for Refugees from
Myanmar, REUTERS (May 11, 2016, 2:00 AM), http://news.trust.org/item/20160511000400-s9
tp7 [https://perma.cc/38EK-P9Q9].
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A state could even be financially compensated for setting aside a zone within
its territory for this purpose. Although the details are varied, some proponents of the
concept believe that the crux lies in self-governance: “Implicit in [the] Refugee
Nation idea is the notion that refugees could govern their own affairs” for their own
political and economic development, rather than rely on humanitarian assistance.113
Under the right set of incentives, companies could be attracted to such free-
haven zones for trade and investment. NGOs, private sector, and supranational orga-
nizations, such as agencies of the United Nations and the European Union (EU),
could work together to create and support such free havens—“refugee zones but
then with rule of law, protection and opportunities for economic investment, where
refugees can actually build up a life and aren’t condemned to wasting their precious
time.”114 Rather than be faced with a deluge of refugees on its own territory, the EU
could establish such offshore free havens with special rule of law and investment
missions. Refugees who wish to move out of camps and to these free havens may
voluntarily choose the latter.115 These refugee free havens would operate essentially
under the same principles as those proposed for charter cities—existing in the
territory of the host country, but allowed a large degree of autonomy with their own
legal and economic policies, provided basic rights are met.116
Consent must be a key feature of such zones, and they would operate on the
basis that:
[i]n a globalised world, given freedom of choice, people ultimately
want to choose where they live, and are likely to seek to move to
where their friends, family and greatest opportunities lie. . . . To
be workable, a Refugee Nation idea would need to be based on
freedom of choice and the lure of opportunity.117
Smaller-scale SEZs such as those established in Jordan to address the displace-
ment of Syrian refugees could also work as an alternative to refugee camps.118 The
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King Hussein Bin Talal Development Area (KHBTDA), a SEZ for Syrian refugees,
has been established and funded with more than 100 million dollars by the Jordanian
government to allow Syrian refugees to receive training and to work.119 The EU and
other countries could provide incentives for companies to invest in the refugee SEZ,
and perhaps change trade rules to permit trade concessions and allow goods from
such zones to enter Europe and other countries at a lower tariff rate.120 Governments
in the area have pledged two billion dollars in aid and investment to the refugee
SEZ, with Jordan itself also pledging to grant 150,000 work permits to Syrian refu-
gees to work in such SEZs.121 Asda, a subsidiary of Walmart, and IKEA have
expressed support, and the World Bank has considered infrastructural financing.122
The former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Gordon Brown, suggested that
SEZs should be created in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, to be funded by oil reve-
nues and managed by a new Middle East Development Bank.123
Some of Jordan’s existing SEZs are underutilized because Jordan’s large educated
working class is not interested in many of the lower-wage, labor-intensive manufactur-
ing jobs available in most SEZs.124 Regional conflicts have affected the level of
foreign direct investment Jordan can attract.125 Consequently, although the KHBTDA
boasts proximity to a modern railway and highway system and state-of-the-art physical
infrastructure, it is underutilized and has been operating at a tenth of its capacity.126 To
address the refugee problem, the international community created the Jordan Compact,
which pledged $2.1 billion to Jordan and an additional $1.9 billion if it provided
Syrian refugees with job opportunities via work permits and the creation of SEZs
where refugees can learn new skills and work.127 Tight labor laws at the national
level have resulted in the exclusion of refugees from the labor market,128 offering
“investors a better business environment than the surrounding area through better
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quality and more efficient delivery of public services, reduced bureaucracy, and
high-quality infrastructure.”129
Special zones can also be created for what we would consider to be illiberal pur-
poses.130 In the 1990s, France created a special transit zone called the zones d’attente
specifically to avoid its obligations as a signatory to the 1951 Convention and Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention).131 For example, as a
signatory,132 France is not allowed to expel asylum seekers—if expulsion would put
their life or liberty at risk—because of race, religion, or other identifiers.133 Claiming
that those showing up at Charles de Gaulle Airport and other ports of entry were not
refugees but economic migrants, France prevented them from setting foot on French
territory by creating special zones that the government declared were not part of
France—even if they were, in fact, on French territory.134 The government wanted
to deny even temporary admittance to those seeking asylum, as well as the possibility
of making a claim that they were refugees.135 Thus, “within the transit zone, [France
could] enforce immigration controls without the constraints that [it] would normally
have within a liberal democratic system.”136 The so-called transit zone was also ex-
tended beyond the area in the airport or a port of entry.137 Thus, the French govern-
ment took “liberties in creating what might be call[ed] . . . smooth spaces, and then in
some situation[s] including nearby hotels, nearby detention centers, even a court many
miles away from the actual airport and still . . . maintaining this idea . . . [that] this
is part of an airport transit zone.”138
The French civil code expanded the “zone d’attente to any place the unwanted alien
must go for administrative procedures, such as to attend an off-site asylum hearing,
or ‘in case of medical necessity.’”139 Thus:
the French designated certain vehicles as floating international
zones and used them to transport the patients to a local hospital,
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relevant parts of which they also designated as temporary inter-
national zones. This entire archipelago of fixed, floating, and
temporary zones, specially created to let foreign nationals stay
within the geographic borders of France but outside of its immi-
gration or asylum territory, lawmakers called zones d’attente
pour personnes en instance (“ZAPI” or “zones d’attente”).140
Other countries have followed the French example—Australia has “migration zones
or excised territory,”141 Hungary has transit zones,142 and the United States has
exempted its territorial waters, long considered under international law to be a part
of the territory of a country, from the reach of applicable asylum laws.143
To return to the example of Honduras—because it has taken the most significant
steps to implement charter cities—charter cities as currently conceived are generally
subject to a governance structure that allows the ZEDE projects to bypass Honduran
laws.144 The ZEDE law passed by Honduras assures investors that control is vested
in their hands and in a Honduran national who is designated a “technical secretary”
to administer a ZEDE zone.145 An “independent commission for best practices”146
(CAMP, or “Comite para la Adopcion de Mejores Practicas”)147 will be formed, and
will promulgate standards dealing with topics such as labor and environmental
concerns.148 CAMP is charged with “approving regulations and recommending judges
in a ZEDE, and setting aside areas for a zone’s future expansion, in accordance with
an undefined set of ‘international best practices.’”149 CAMP norms are analogous to
international norms, thus bypassing national regulations and laws.150 The CAMP
Committee has oversight of ZEDEs in a way analogous to a board of trustees having
oversight of a university.151 CAMP thus not only supervises ZEDE operations but
even has the power, under Article 11 of the ZEDE Statute, to remove each ZEDE’s
head, the Technical Secretary.152
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Special ZEDE courts, not the pre-existing national courts, adjudicate civil and
criminal cases in the zone, and ZEDE judges can be foreign judges empowered to
hear such cases.153 There is also “[a] ‘tribunal of individual rights’” operating in ac-
cordance with international conventions whose “decisions can be appealed to interna-
tional courts” which will be formed to protect residents.154 Whatever the details, the
general framework for charter cities is that private law, much like a corporate
charter, will be a substitute for national law: “The investing company must write the
laws that govern the territory, establish the local government, hire a private police
force, and even has the right to set the educational system and collect taxes.”155
The charter city concept has many critics.156 Despite promises that they will turn
poor countries into Hong Kong and Dubai,157 some believe they will become a sort
of modern slavery outpost, a neocolonial, razor-wired port of convenience.158 Labor
and environmental rights might be violated by corporations.159 National sovereignty
is wrongly subsumed under international capital in the name of development.160 As
a local fisherman bemoaned: “They will allow investors to kidnap the state.”161
Critics are concerned that encroachment on national sovereignty, substitution
of private law for public law, power concentration in foreign investors, and undemo-
cratic principles or the absence of democratic safeguards will mean that the experi-
ment will be “little more than predatory, privatized utopias, with far-reaching, negative
implications for Honduran sovereignty and the well-being of poor communities.”162
That the charter cities are enthusiastically supported by U.S. conservatives and
libertarians has made the project all the more controversial, provoking fear among
liberals that “the plan [is] yet another instance of neocolonial collaboration between
U.S. and Central American elites—one that’s sold as ‘development,’ but only con-
centrates wealth,” as evidenced by the infamous intervention of the United Fruit
Company into Honduras in the early 1900s.163 Some residents in the proposed ZEDE
areas worry that the substitution of private for public law will leave them with little
control over developments in the area.164 Latin America, for instance, has historically
“been a place for imported economic experiments, but experiments aren’t exciting
for the people who live [t]here; it’s different when it’s your house that’s being
153 ECONOMIST, Honduras Experiments with Charter Cities, supra note 46.
154 Id.
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experimented with.”165 Professor Paul Romer, one of the most enthusiastic support-
ers of charter cities,166 has stated that he is nonetheless “‘concerned that the far-
reaching delegation of what really are powers of government to private entities and
foreign, private individuals is taking place without sufficient debate’ between the
government and [its] critics.”167
The lack of a formal property titling system in many parts of the country has also
led many long-time residents to worry that they will be evicted from the land be-
cause they have no formal proof of title.168 Fishermen who have been in zones
potentially subject to the ZEDE fear they would be deemed illegal squatters and thus
subject to dispossession.169
Some Hondurans have looked at the economies of Costa Rica and Panama and
noted that neither country has needed to resort to ZEDEs, because instead of resorting
to “model cities,” they have focused on constructing “a model Supreme Court, a
model Congress, and a model government.”170 In other words, according to these
critics, what Honduras or any country needs is development and a robust rule of law.171
Why some countries are able to embark on such a path and some are not is a peren-
nial question that has been analyzed and dissected.172 But of course, the issue here
is whether charter cities can be a spark that jump-starts model laws.
The purpose of this Article is to examine and evaluate charter cities and their
varying permutations. More attention has been given to charter cities formed to attract
foreign investment and establish or accelerate market reform.173 This may be due to the
success of China’s economic laboratory begun in Shenzhen.174 But this Article shows
that the concept is much broader and can be applied to different contexts. Part I of
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the Article introduces the concept of charter cities. It also discusses and evaluates
charges against charter cities as neocolonial experiments that are contrary to liberal
democratic norms. Part II examines the potential impact posed by this radical privatiza-
tion trend and asks what impact it poses to the people who live in such cities. What
rights do nationals have in zones that have been set aside and are not subject to the host
country’s laws? Part II also explores principles of coercion, consent, and democratic
accountability. How should such zones be formed in order to maximize consent and
minimize, if not eradicate, coercion? Is voluntary mobility rather than democratic
accountability a sufficient proxy for consent? Part II lays out conditions that charter
cities should meet so that they can be considered legitimate under international law.
I. WHAT ARE CHARTER CITIES, AND WHY FORM THEM?
A. Investment Charter Cities
The rapid pace of urbanization worldwide will mean that mass migration into cities
will create major challenges for those existing cities.175 The migration crisis, in Europe
and in the United States, caused an influx of migrants from the Middle East and
Central America respectively,176 resulting in renewed interest in the living conditions
that fueled migration. That so many would risk everything to leave their homes for an
uncertain future elsewhere also demonstrates the need for better living conditions
in their home countries.177 An alternative is the establishment of new charter cities
that those seeking a better life could migrate to.178 Most proponents of charter cities
cite the ability to move freely into and out of charter cities as a foundational principle
of the charter.179 Because the city is chartered on uninhabited land, new charter rules
are not forced on existing residents because only people who agree to live under charter
rules would move into the charter city.180 This “process of self-selection ensures that
the social norms of the residents map more smoothly to the formal rules in the city’s
charter and that the rules have the legitimacy that comes from universal consent.”181
Start-up cities have advantages that existing cities do not have; one of them is the
advantage of starting from scratch.182 Typically, charter cities can be founded by the
enactment and adoption of a charter that commits the city to “key principles of
reform.”183 “If the charter specifies good rules (or in our professional jargon, good
175 CTR. GLOBAL DEV., supra note 166.
176 See Archibold, supra note 61; Betts, supra note 100.
177 See Taylor, supra note 112.
178 CTR. GLOBAL DEV., supra note 166.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Romer, supra note 73.
183 Charter Cities, MARRON INST. URB. MGMT., https://marroninstitute.nyu.edu/initiatives
/charter-cities [https://perma.cc/XRU4-KPT9].
2019] CHARTER CITIES 737
institutions) millions of people will come together to build a new city.”184 But why not
simply eliminate bad rules and pass good rules in pre-existing cities? The evidence sug-
gests that, for reasons such as inertia, path dependency, and interest-group capture:
many societies are stuck with bad rules. Moving from bad rules
to better ones may be much harder than most economists have
allowed. The construct of a charter city is a suggestion about
how we can change the dynamics of rules. It is a way to speed
up the rate of improvement in the rules.185
An analogy can be drawn from the corporate-law context.186 Improvements in
corporate-law rules are more likely to take place with the entry of new
organizations.187 An organization with good internal rules that worked in one setting
but not in a new, changing context is more likely to adapt and adopt new rules if it
is faced with new entries.188 For example, new organizations such as Intel and Apple
spurred the adoption of new rules and transformed the dynamics in an industry once
dominated by IBM, and rules that worked well for interfacing with big corporations
and data centers, but not necessarily optimal for speeding up change in the
industry.189 As such, “[i]t is good to have competition between firms in an
industry—competition both in the sense of a variety of existing firms that someone can
choose from, and . . . in the sense that a new firm can enter and do things differently.”190
Charter cities can be “a way to bring the power of entry and choice to the dynamics of
the rules for cities.”191
Different charters can emphasize different arrangements depending on the needs
of the cities at issue and depending on the context.192 Once a new city is chartered and
started up, anyone who agrees to live under the charter’s principles can show consent
by moving there or staying there.193 In that respect, there can be “reform without coer-
cion.”194 Though the specifics of reform depend on the local context, charter cities
should share two foundational principles: freedom of movement and equality.195 In
184 Can “Charter Cities” Change the World? A Q&A with Paul Romer, FREAKONOMICS
(Sept. 29, 2009, 11:24 AM), http://freakonomics.com/2009/09/29/can-charter-cities-change-the
-world-a-qa-with-paul-romer [https://perma.cc/8HJX-UM3V].
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Romer, supra note 73.
191 FREAKONOMICS, supra note 184.
192 Id.
193 See Romer, supra note 73.
194 Id.
195 MARRON INST. URB. MGMT., supra note 183.
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other words, “people must be free to choose whether [to move to the charter city,]
and those who do must [be guaranteed] equality under the law.”196
Moreover, in charter cities, different rules enshrined in the charter can be used to
experiment with new, even unorthodox forms of governance.197 Some charter cities
“draw on the expertise of different national or municipal governments, engaging
reputable partners in an effort to attract residents, businesses, and investors.”198 Dif-
ferent jurisdictions have already experimented with different types of innovative
practices, importing them when deemed necessary.199 For example, before the Beijing
Olympics, the Chinese government imported services from the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration of the United States (FAA), asking the FAA to revise its aviation safety
rules.200 In addition, Mauritius has imported the services provided by the Supreme
Court of Britain,201 and as part of an aid package struck between the two governments,
the Solomon Islands have imported police and judicial services from Australia.202
A number of countries have begun experimenting with this concept.203 As
mentioned previously, for example, Madagascar explored unconventional ways of
attracting foreign investment, for example, leasing a large tract of land on its ter-
ritory to “Daewoo, a South Korean corporation, for 99 years.”204 Under the proposal,
Daewoo and Madagascar’s neighbor, Mauritius (acting as trustee), would “administer
[the] export-processing zone on Malagasy territory.”205 The deal did not go through,206
but it still serves as an interesting case study of a modern-day charter city-trustee-
ship concept.207
196 Id.
197 Romer, supra note 73.
198 MARRON INST. URB. MGMT., supra note 183.
199 Id.
200 Unbundling the Nation State, ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.economist.com
/international/2014/02/07/unbundling-the-nation-state [https://perma.cc/N8G2-UHWL].
201 The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, JUD. COMM. PRIVY COUNCIL, https://www
.supremecourt.uk/docs/beginners-guide-to-the-jcpc.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HK9-F45C] (“The
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) is the highest court of appeal for a number of
commonwealth countries, crown dependencies and United Kingdom overseas territories.”).
Many countries such as Jamaica and Mauritius, among others, still opt to keep the JCPC as their
highest court of appeal. See id.; Robert Mendick & Joshi Eichner Herrmann, Britain’s Top
Judges—and Their Wives—Move Court to Mauritius for a Week, TELEGRAPH (June 26, 2010,
9:00 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/7855991/Britains-top
-judges-and-their-wives-move-court-to-Mauritius-for-a-week.html [https://perma.cc/WZG2
-GZT7]; see also Paul Romer, Charter Cities and Reform Zones, PAUL ROMER (July 16, 2014),
https://paulromer.net/charter-cities-and-reform-zones [https://perma.cc/UE7E-TJPA].
202 Joseph D. Foukona, Regional Intervention in Solomon Islands, 9 J. S. PAC. L. (2005),
http://www.paclii.org/journals/fJSPL/vol09no1/4.shtml [https://perma.cc/NXQ4-38GG].
203 MARRON INST. URB. MGMT., supra note 183.
204 Mallaby, supra note 20.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 See id.
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Established in 2006, Masdar City in the United Arab Emirates has become “an
emerging global clean-technology cluster” with the objective of establishing a “sus-
tainable urban development powered by renewable energy.”208 Pursuant to the city’s
charter, plans were adopted to institute policies aimed at achieving “zero waste, sus-
tainable transport, building energy efficiency standards, biodiversity strategy policies,
and renewable energy requirements.”209 Masdar City will use renewable resources
to “obtain 100% of its energy, relying on photovoltaics, solar power, wind, and the
conversion of waste to energy.”210 “Businesses and homes [are linked to] green data
centers which use [only] energy-saving servers.”211 The results expected included
better air quality indoors and outdoors; “green job creation”; and “reduction[ ] in
greenhouse gas emissions, water consumption, and landfill waste.”212
This Article focuses on charter cities, and particularly those being formed in
Honduras, because the Honduran example demonstrates that the concept has moved
from theoretical and scholarly discussions to reality.213 But it is important to note
that there are also alternative forms of hybrid zones being discussed and considered,
such as legal, economic, administrative, and political jurisdictions (LEAP zones); free
cities; and startup cities.214 Mark Klugmann, the founder of Legal, Economic, Admin-
istrative, and Political Jurisdictions, explains that unlike SEZs, which he calls “chair[s]
with one leg,”215 LEAP zones do not concentrate only on economics but more com-
prehensively on legal, administrative, and political development216 (although one could
add that in all fairness, neither do charter cities). The legal development agenda
requires a focus on judges and judicial independence as well as on alternative dispute
resolution, including international arbitration.217 LEAP zones are essentially sup-
ported by rule-of-law development, with an emphasis on minimizing corruption and
increasing stability and transparency.218
208 Masdar City Special Economic Development Zone, PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE SDGS,
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnership/?p=2036 [https://perma.cc/6V2Q-2388].
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 See Mackey, supra note 144.
214 WORLD BANK, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: PROGRESS, EMERGING CHALLENGES, AND
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 5 (Thomas Farole & Gokhan Akinci eds., 2011), http://documents.world
bank.org/curated/en/752011468203980987/pdf/638440PUB0Exto00Box0361527B0PUBLIC0
.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA7L-C7CR] (indicating that in 2006 there were more than 3,500 SEZs
estimated to exist in 130 countries).
215 Mark Klugmann, LEAP Zones: Faster Growth with Less Conflict, CAYMANIAN FIN. REV.
(July 12, 2013), https://www.caymanfinancialreview.com/2013/07/12/leap-zones-faster-growth
-with-less-conflict [https://perma.cc/JRR8-CZFN].
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id. (“In its finest expression it will mean a responsive system of governance that assures
740 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:717
Startup cities take a substantially different approach than the other models. The
model does not recommend, much less require, the adoption of specific institutions or
principles.219 Rather, as the name implies, the model proposes treating municipal gov-
ernments similar to startup technology companies; specifically, municipal govern-
ments are vested with broad authority and able to experiment with various policies.220
Thus, much like a technology company, the success or failure of a municipality largely
depends on its ability to create a desirable system, and attract citizens and investors.221
In essence, charter cities expand the scope and scale of reforms in SEZs to catalyze
social and economic development in countries with poor rules.222 A fully developed
charter city has yet to be established, if at all;223 thus, the following provides a basic
overview of the model. The next section includes a discussion of the elements common
to charter cities. Section I.C. discusses the development-orientation of charter cities
and explains why they can be an effective method of stimulating development.
B. Characteristics of the Charter City
A rigid definition of charter city is elusive because of the model’s intentional flex-
ibility and limited application.224 However, there are four key principles that proponents
of charter cities such as Romer espouse: (1) undeveloped land; (2) a charter of basic
rules; (3) freedom of choice; and (4) equal treatment under the law for all citizens.225
Charter cities, at least as originally envisioned by Romer, require a previously
undeveloped piece of land large enough to support an entire city.226 Second, the city
must have a charter generally specifying the rules necessary to attract investors and
stability and transparency under rule of law. At a minimum it must mean that the system is not
at risk of being up-ended every time there is a change in the national government.”).
219 MARRON INST. URB. MGMT., supra note 183.
220 Jack Preston, Startup Cities: Can Entrepreneurship Save Politics?, VIRGIN (July 28,
2014), https://www.virgin.com/entrepreneur/startup-cities-can-entrepreneurship-save-politics
[https://perma.cc/BGG5-HBXW] (“Startup Cities is a new approach to reform that uses
small, highly autonomous municipalities to pilot reform projects before they are scaled to the
national level.”).
221 Id.
222 FULLER & ROMER, supra note 38, at 1; Paul Romer, Why the World Needs Charter Cities
at TED Global 2009, TED 00:44, 09:33 (July 2009) [hereinafter Romer, Why the World Needs
Charter Cities] (transcript available at http:// www.ted.com/talks/paul_romer [https://perma
.cc/5TY9-CSKJ]).
223 Dade, supra note 33, at ii (“What Paul Romer and Brandon Fuller propose is an experi-
ment and there remain details to be ironed out.”).
224 FULLER & ROMER, supra note 38, at 7 (explaining that a charter should be broad and
flexible).
225 Id.; Romer, Why the World Needs Charter Cities, supra note 222, at 09:33.
226 FULLER & ROMER, supra note 38, at 7 (“A good target size is 1,000 square kilometers,
roughly the size of Hong Kong and Singapore.”); Romer, Why the World Needs Charter Cities,
supra note 222, at 08:15.
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residents.227 Ideally, the charter should not be so specific as to limit experimentation
and innovation in the city.228 Third, citizens and leaders must be ensured a broad
commitment to choice reflected in the ability to opt in or out depending on whether
a citizen finds the policies adopted favorable.229 Fourth, all citizens must be guaran-
teed equal application of the law; this principle is necessary to offer legitimacy to
the charter city’s government and attract citizens—much the same way religious
freedom was integral to attracting citizens in Pennsylvania.230
Moreover, there are three distinct roles that actors can play, including: host,
source, and partner.231 The host country provides land, the source country provides
citizens, and the partner country helps ensure legitimacy by promising enforcement
of laws and equality under the charter.232 However, a single country can play all three
roles—thus creating a charter city internally—provided the existing government is
credibly able to commit to enforcing the charter equally.233 Notably, these concepts are
interconnected and must function together. For example, the freedom of choice pro-
vided to leaders is demonstrated through the decision to develop a charter city.234
Further, developing the city on undeveloped land demonstrates that citizens are free to
choose to opt in or out rather than being forced to remain in their existing home in a
charter city or leave.235 Finally, both choices help legitimize the authority of the
charter city government to would-be residents and investors who can thereby rely
on the local government and foreign partner to enforce the charter equally.236
227 FULLER & ROMER, supra note 38, at 7.
228 Id. (“Of course, a charter should not specify a centralized economic plan. Nor should
it contain rules for a detailed spatial plan for the city, one that specifies what people can do
in every specific location. The rules that will encourage economic opportunities and vibrant
city life will be those that leave broad scope for experiments and let competition and choice
determine which experiments persist.”).
229 Id. at 1 (“In a charter city, legitimacy derives from residents’ decisions to opt-in to the
new rules as well as the social inclusion that follows from equal application of the rules to
all residents.”); Romer, Why the World Needs Charter Cities, supra note 222, at 09:33 (“You
start from uninhabited territory. People can come live under the new charter, but no one is
forced to live under it.”).
230 FULLER & ROMER, supra note 38, at 6–7 (“In a charter city, legitimacy derives from . . .
the social inclusion that follows from equal application of the rules to all residents. For example,
William Penn’s charter for Pennsylvania (which inspired the term, charter city) was a critical step
in the development of rules that enforce a separation between church and state. His legal guar-
antee of freedom of conscience attracted people from all over Europe. It had instant legitimacy
for the immigrants at a time when religious tolerance in Europe and the United States was ex-
tremely controversial.”).
231 Id. at 7.
232 Id.
233 Id. (“The key to going it alone is the ability of the central government to credibly commit
to would-be residents and investors that the special rules in a new reform zone will be upheld.”).
234 See id.
235 See id.
236 See id.
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Even though the Honduran reform was based only partially on charter cities,237
and although its major proponent Paul Romer no longer supports the project,238 it pro-
vides a strong example of what a charter city should—and, perhaps more accurately,
should not—resemble. La Región Especiál de Desarrollo (RED), the doomed precursor
to ZEDE, was originally intended to offer citizens better choices by establishing a city
on a previously undeveloped area of land in Honduras.239 Originally, Honduras was
to work cooperatively with an international partner to ensure provision and enforce-
ment of better rules.240 First, the RED was to work cooperatively with Mauritius to
establish an external court of appeal.241 Second, the RED was supposed to include a
nine-person Transparency Commission serving as pro tempore members.242 Further,
the President would appoint a governor; thereafter, the Transparency Commission
would select the replacement until the Commission relegated the election authority
to the citizens of the RED.243 Additionally, the Commission would have authority
to audit actions of the RED officials, whether financial or otherwise, and appoint
their own replacements.244 The Commission’s authority would be checked by the
ability of the Honduran Legislature to alter the zone by a qualifying vote.245
Several realities of the Honduran system led Romer to withdraw his support for the
project, and these realities should serve as a cautionary tale to all such experiments.246
237 Dade, supra note 33, at ii (“The government of Honduras is working to establish a special
development region that is based in part on the idea of a charter city.”).
238 Elisabeth Malkin, Plan for Charter City to Fight Honduras Poverty Loses Its Initiator,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2012), https://nyti.ms/2QQhvLa.
239 FULLER & ROMER, supra note 38, at 8 (“To bring economic opportunities closer to home,
the Honduran National Congress recently defined a new legal entity, the Special Development
Region, known locally as la Región Especial de Desarrollo (RED).”); Tom W. Bell, Startup City
Redux: Honduras: From RED to ZEDE to . . . Freedom?, FOUND. ECON. EDUC. (June 27, 2013),
https://fee.org/articles/startup-city-redux [https://perma.cc/7AKV-JCYM] [hereinafter Bell,
Startup City Redux].
240 FULLER & ROMER, supra note 38, at 9 (“[T]he government is looking to its allies for
partners that can help provide the rule of law necessary to generate investment, jobs, and safety
in the first RED.”).
241 Id. at 11 (“Just as the strength and integrity of the Mauritian court system has been key
to enhancing growth and development in Mauritius, the governments in Honduras and Mauritius
believe that this historic agreement will ensure an independent judiciary in the RED and will
provide important assurances to potential residents and investors.”).
242 Id. at 9–10.
243 Id. at 10.
244 Id. at 9–10.
245 Id. at 9 (“The Transparency Commission will be largely independent of future gov-
ernments in Honduras. To change the enabling legislation that specifies the powers of the
Transparency Commission, the Honduran Congress would need a two-thirds majority vote
of approval as well as an approval by referendum among the residents of the RED. This
procedure serves two purposes: it provides a check on the conduct of the Transparency Com-
mission, but it also sets a very high hurdle for any future Honduran government that wishes
to interfere in the reform zones.”).
246 Bell, No Exit, supra note 44 (explaining that “[t]hanks to his fame as a respected academic
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Romer withdrew from the reform shortly after the assassination of a Honduran human
rights attorney, who was responsible for bringing a constitutional challenge to the
RED legislation prompting the questionable removal of four Supreme Court justices
who posed a threat to the reform.247 Romer attributes his withdrawal to opaque decision-
making by the Honduran government, without the approval of the Transparency
Commission required under the RED legislation, which charter cities are intended
to remedy.248 Regardless, the result has been a new reform and widespread criticism
regarding his theoretical approach for being detached from the violent realities of
Honduran politics.249
C. The Inspiration for Charter Cities
Law and development scholarship has shown that one of the reasons rule-of-law
projects have not succeeded is because pre-existing poor rules and institutions impede
development. Charter cities allow development to take place from a clean slate, with
and successful entrepreneur, many came to see Romer as the genius behind the Honduran
RED project. He wasn’t, but it must be admitted that citing Romer’s work—including his
very convincing TED talk—helped the Lobo administration sell REDs to the Honduran Con-
gress. Romer visited Honduras, advised the government, and evidently viewed the REDs as
an opportunity to implement charter cities. It was not to be, however.”); Arthur Phillips,
Charter Cities in Honduras?, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.opendemocracy
.net/opensecurity/arthur-phillips/charter-cities-in-honduras [https://perma.cc/ZF2J-KECJ]
(describing a new law that has replaced the RED legislation, which includes implementing
zones in currently occupied territories, unlike in the charter cities proposal).
247 Emma Feltes, ‘Charter Cities’ and Escalating Human Rights Violations in Honduras:
Will Canadian Investment Continue?, RABBLE.CA (Oct. 5, 2012), http://rabble.ca/news/2012
/10/charter-cities-honduras-crumble-human-rights-violations-escalate-will-canada-keep-inves
[https://perma.cc/H8MZ-PJ7W] (“Although no mention of the violence and political contro-
versy shrouding the Charter Cities initiative has been made, Romer’s withdrawal immediately
follows the assassination of Trejo-Cabrera. At their own peril, human rights organizations
throughout Honduras have long been battling Charter Cities, and Trejo-Cabrera had received
numerous death threats since filing a Constitutional challenge to the project. These persisted
up until his assassination last week.”); Phillips, supra note 246.
248 Brian Doherty, Honduran Private City Plan Shot Down by Its Supreme Court, REASON
(Oct. 4, 2012, 11:38 am), https://reason.com/blog/2012/10/04/honduran-private-city-plan
-shot-down-by [https://perma.cc/L4PR-9SM6] (explaining that Romer stated that he left the
project after the Honduran government signed a memorandum of understanding with its first
investor without properly informing the Transparency Commission).
249 Keane Bhatt, Reporting on Romer’s Charter Cities: How the Media Sanitize Honduras’
Brutal Regime, N. AM. CONG. LATIN AM. (Feb. 19, 2013), https://nacla.org/news/2013/2/19/re
porting-romer%E2%80%99s-charter-cities-how-media-sanitize-honduras%E2%80%99s
-brutal-regime [https://perma.cc/5TSB-KSQT] (describing how “Romer’s lofty theories . . .
remained utterly detached from the brutal nature of the [Honduran] government”). See Bell,
Startup City Redux, supra note 239 (“The first effort to establish in Honduras what have been
called ‘startup cities’ thus died. But Honduran reformers did not give up.”); Whan-woo, supra
note 49 (explaining how South Korea is providing economic support to the ZEDE).
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reforms implemented not piecemeal but on an appropriately large scale to achieve
the desired result.250 Take as an example this hypothetical, but entirely realistic,
example of an African student who has a cell phone but studies under a street light
because he cannot access electricity in his home.251 The student lacks electricity
because policies in the country provide several energy subsidies and fix the price
such that the electric company loses money for every new customer it takes.252
Although the president has tried to have the national policies changed so energy
companies would have an incentive to take new customers, the individuals already
benefiting from low-cost electricity are able to impede changes by exploiting the
difficulty of changing national-level rules and raising sufficient opposition.253 Fixing
poor rules often requires entirely new sets of institutions, and the scale of change has
to be large enough to create a significant change and small enough that it is replicable
and sustainable.254 Large-scale charter cities can provide the institutions necessary
to stimulate change at an effective level.
First, charter cities are an especially effective mechanism for harnessing what
has been called the “Urbanization Project” in development aid.255 Shlomo Angel,
250 FULLER & ROMER, supra note 38, at 4–5.
251 Romer, Why the World Needs Charter Cities, supra note 222, at 00:00–00:21. See
generally Roger Nord, Reforming Energy Subsidies Is Critical for Realizing Africa’s Growth Po-
tential, IDEAS FOR DEV. (May 13, 2013), http://ideas4development.org/en/reforming-energy
-subsidies-is-critical-for-realizing-africas-growth-potential [https://perma.cc/A44Q-AXNR].
252 Romer, Why the World Needs Charter Cities, supra note 222, at 00:44; Nord, supra note
251 (“In Sub-Saharan Africa, direct energy subsidies averaged close to 3 percent of GDP in
2012—as much as public health spending in many countries. They are costly to the budget
and crowd out other spending, including on much-needed infrastructure and social services.
And this estimate does not include the cost of environmental externalities, which would add
a further ½ percent of GDP. With many low-income countries in Africa facing tight budget
constraints, energy subsidies divert resources away from many more productive and deserving
spending programs.”).
253 Romer, Why the World Needs Charter Cities, supra note 222, at 00:21; Nord, supra note
251 (“Energy subsidies persist, in part, because they are a convenient fiscal tool, requiring little
administrative capacity, to provide benefits to the population. Lack of public support for subsidy
removal is in part due to a lack of confidence that governments would use the savings from
removal of subsidies for programs that would benefit the poor or address pressing economic
and social needs. For these reasons, many countries have had difficulty reforming subsidies.”).
254 Dade, supra note 33.
255 FULLER & ROMER, supra note 38, at 3 (“Roughly 10,000 years ago, humans began a re-
markable undertaking, what Shlomo Angel has called ‘the Urbanization Project.’ Ever since,
we have been drawing together in dense urban areas. This project is roughly halfway done;
about 3.5 billion people now live in cities. By the end of this century, total population will likely
stabilize at 10 to 11 billion, and most societies will converge in urban areas at rates of 70 to 80
percent.”). See also UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, WORLD URBANIZATION
PROSPECTS: THE 2009 REVISION 1 (2010) (“Between 2009 and 2050, the world population is
expected to increase by 2.3 billion, passing from 6.8 billion to 9.1 billion. At the same time, the
population living in urban areas is projected to gain 2.9 billion, passing from 3.4 billion in
2009 to 6.3 billion 2050. Thus, the urban areas of the world are expected to absorb all the
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Professor of City Planning at the New York University Stern Urbanization Project,
explained “[w]e should care about urban expansion if we want the new areas to be
productive, [and] to be integrated into the metropolitan economy.”256 Further, he
argued that urban growth should be prepared for as “these expansion areas need to
be connected to the metropolitan economy in order for the city to be productive.”257
Angel therefore proposed that policies should be directed to supporting efficient urban
expansion, rather than trying, pointlessly, to contain them.258 Thus, the urbanization
project is a unique opportunity for the development field to harness rapidly increas-
ing urban populations in charter cities.259
Second, development projects must manage political risk—which appears in two
different forms—to provide better rules for citizens and leaders.260 The first political
risk involves situations where the government is dysfunctional and cannot attract citi-
zens or investors because it cannot commit to properly enforcing laws.261 Notably, de-
veloping countries could overcome this impediment by creating partnerships with
countries whose commitment to ensuring the equal application of laws provided in a
charter would offer legitimacy to the host country’s promise.262 The second form of po-
litical risk involves a government with institutions incapable of protecting itself from
exploitation by third parties.263 In those circumstances, better institutions, implemented
with the help of foreign partners could again address the conditions of underdevelop-
ment and poverty which have allowed predatory entities to exploit state institutional
weakness.264 Through charter cities, the promise by a host government equally and ef-
fectively to enforce charter provisions encouraging socially and economically beneficial
entities to invest in the area could be deemed to be more credible by investors.265
population growth expected over the next four decades while at the same time drawing in some
of the rural population.” (citation omitted)).
256 Alex Rogala, Solly Angel on How Cities Make Room Now for Growth Tomorrow, THE
CITY FIX (Jan. 17, 2018), http://thecityfix.com/blog/solly-angel-on-how-cities-can-make-room
-now-for-growth-tomorrow-alex-rogala [https://perma.cc/5D67-LMXT].
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 FULLER & ROMER, supra note 38, at 14 (“No other time has or will see such an enormous
demand for urban life. It would be a tragedy if new urban settlements simply replicate the
defective forms of governance from which people are so eager to escape. Reform zones can
meet the demands for both urban living and better governance.”).
260 Id. at 4.
261 Id. at 4; Romer, Why the World Needs Charter Cities, supra note 222, at 04:09.
262 FULLER & ROMER, supra note 38, at 4, 7.
263 Id. at 4 (“A more pernicious form arises when a government is too weak to prevent so-
cially harmful opportunism by predatory firms. Where such risks are high, firms that are efficient
and honest stay away. The firms that remain, those that specialize in exploiting institutional
weakness, end up limiting competition and opposing reform.”).
264 Id. at 4, 7.
265 Id. (“The political risks inherent in weak governance, along with related problems such
as crime and violence, are enough to keep potentially lucrative and socially beneficial infra-
structure investment away from the parts of the world that need it most.”).
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Third, charter cities could harness urbanization at an effective scale.266 Specifi-
cally, a substantial number of the world’s poor would willingly move to an area with
better rules if they had the option.267 Unfortunately, countries with better rules often
either cannot or will not accept such individuals,268 and even if they do, transferring
many of the benefits back to an individual’s country is difficult.269 By establishing cities
on undeveloped land, rules in the charter city could differ substantially from those else-
where in the country,270 thereby providing the benefits of better rules to citizens who
choose to opt in, while substantially reducing the costs associated with immigrating to
the territory and transferring benefits home.271 Instituting reforms at the city level would
provide a significant impact by requiring surrounding cities to adopt better policies to
compete for citizens at a scale capable of being replicated elsewhere in the country
without the difficulty and cost of reforming policies nationally.272 Finally, the cost
of developing such cities would be substantially less than the potential increase in
economic output that would follow from offering an entire city’s worth of people
more opportunities.273
D. Honduras as Hong Kong
As mentioned, supporters of charter cities point to Hong Kong and to other SEZs
in China as examples of how better institutions can help produce good rules and
266 Id. at 5–6.
267 Id. at 5 (“The world’s poor are well aware that better rules prevail elsewhere. Gallup
reports that 630 million people would like to move permanently to another country. If such
migration were allowed, more would surely follow as people in the developing world began to
learn of opportunities elsewhere through their increasingly global social and familial networks.”).
268 Id. at 6.
269 Dade, supra note 33, at i–6 (“More than just money, these diasporas are also sending and
bringing home new ideas for businesses, for education, and understanding and expectations
for how societies and rules should function to allow economic growth and freedom. Though
these transfers are having impacts at the family, neighbourhood, and village levels the im-
pacts are still too disaggregated, too slow, and too atomized to have impact at the national or
even regional level and to create macro level self-sustaining change.”).
270 FULLER & ROMER, supra note 38, at 6.
271 Id.
272 Id. (“To grow, new cities will have to attract new residents by offering good rules. In
doing so, successful new cities will give existing cities stronger incentives to reform. This com-
petitive dynamic suggests a very different way to think about development policy.”).
273 Id. at 5–6 (explaining that the gain derived from providing better choices for billions
of people would be “large enough even to dwarf the cost of building the new cities where they
could move. To put this gain in context, consider that, by most estimates, further reductions
in barriers to trade would increase worldwide income by less than a few percentage points. The
estimated gain from letting all people move to places with good rules? An increase in world-
wide income of 50 to 150 percent”).
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economic development.274 For example, although China was at one point a world
leader responsible for developing several important technological advances, includ-
ing steel, printing, and gunpowder—its obsolete rules cut it off from the rest of the
world, preventing it from capitalizing on the spread of these technologies until the
1970s—when its economy hit a period of rapid growth.275 Romer, for example,
argues that adopting British institutions and markets in Hong Kong during this
period stimulated massive growth and poverty reduction in China.276 Further, the in-
stitutions in Hong Kong at the time were substantially different from those else-
where in China, but were nonetheless legitimized in part by China’s partnership with
the British, resulting even in the establishment in Hong Kong, after its reversion to
China, of an external court of appeal composed of foreign judges.277
Moreover, the scale at which China adopted British institutions substantially in-
fluenced growth.278 Specifically, by adopting reforms at the city level, China recognized
the value of better institutions implemented at a significant scale while preserving legiti-
macy by not imposing reforms throughout the entire country.279 The scale of the experi-
ment also allowed citizens simply to migrate or travel to Hong Kong to obtain benefits
of its economic success, and allowed institutions to be easily replicated and transplanted
to SEZs and eventually fourteen coastal cities.280 One could argue that the British inad-
vertently did more in Hong Kong to stimulate development than any aid program
274 Dade, supra note 33, at i. See also FULLER & ROMER, supra note 38, at 12; Romer, Why
the World Needs Charter Cities, supra note 222, at 04:52, 07:38 (“Now, China dramatically
demonstrates both the potential and the challenges of working with rules.”).
275 Romer, Why the World Needs Charter Cities, supra note 222, at 04:52 (“And [China]
soon adopted rules which slowed down innovation and cut China off from the rest of the
world. So as other countries in the world innovated, in the sense both of developing newer
technologies, but also developing newer rules, the Chinese were cut off from those advances.
Income there stayed stagnant, as it zoomed ahead in the rest of the world.”).
276 Id. at 06:05 (explaining that Hong Kong for most of the twentieth century operated under
structures based on working market economies run by the British).
277 FULLER & ROMER, supra note 38, at 12 (“To guarantee the credibility and independence
of [the Chinese Court established after regaining control of Hong Kong], China, through a treaty
with Britain, agreed that justices for this new court could be recruited from other common
law jurisdictions.”).
278 Dade, supra note 33, at i.
279 FULLER & ROMER, supra note 38, at 14–15. See also Romer, Why the World Needs
Charter Cities, supra note 222, at 07:04 (“But Deng Xiaoping instinctively understood the
importance of offering choices to his people. So instead of forcing everyone in China to shift
immediately to the market model, they proceeded by creating some special zones that could
do, in a sense, what Britain did: make the opportunity to go work with the market rules avail-
able to the people who wanted to opt in there.”).
280 Romer, Why the World Needs Charter Cities, supra note 222, at 07:38 (“So after the
four special zones, there were 14 coastal cites [sic] that were open in the same sense, and
eventually demonstrated successes in these places that people could opt in to, that they flocked
to because of the advantages they offered. Demonstrated successes there led to a consensus
for a move toward the market model for the entire economy.”).
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throughout the last century, suggesting that similar elements could be implemented in
charter cities, beyond economic reforms, to stimulate growth in developing nations.281
In a nod to Hong Kong, the Honduran government has established what it calls
model cities to provide its citizens with “alternative jurisdictions in which they can
find safety and opportunities.”282 The concept is designed “to overcome stagnation
in public policy . . . [through] a public-sector analogue to startup businesses”
whereby charter cities compete with existing governments,283 becoming a catalyst
for change in the same way that new startups in the business world shake things up.
For example, an established firm like IBM, whose business culture has historically
been geared towards serving institutional customers looking for mainframe computers,
was not nimble enough to adapt and adjust to the rise of noninstitutional, individual
computer customers.284 Because changing IBM’s culture and reforming old rules
were difficult, a void appeared which allowed smaller startups like Apple and Dell
to enter the market and compete for household consumers.285
Established businesses even spawn new versions of themselves deliberately, cre-
ating “experimental subsidiaries known as ‘skunkworks’”286 that function as the internal
equivalent of startups. Target is an example. The retailer Dayton Company created
it as a spin-off company with its own charter, using new rules that were so success-
ful that the Dayton Company itself opted to use Target’s formula.287 The aim is as
follows: charter cities could jump-start development in the cities themselves but also
in the country in which they are chartered as well as in surrounding countries. “If
companies can change themselves by setting up subsidiaries with new rules, coun-
tries could do the same with charter cities.”288 Law and development projects have
traditionally focused on creating change from within developing countries—that is,
spurring change from within.289 Charter cities operate on a different presumption—that
“[c]hange from without comes more easily than change from within. Industrial prog-
ress comes from new entrants and new experiments, not from the slow process of
changing established corporate bureaucracies.”290
Following the Hong Kong and Singapore model, Honduras would set aside land
upon which to establish charter cities and the cities would own the land, leasing out
281 See FULLER & ROMER, supra note 38, at 14 (“By creating the conditions that let a new
city emerge in Hong Kong, Britain can claim credit for the single most effective program of
development assistance ever undertaken.”).
282 See Miller, supra note 65, at 272.
283 Id. at 275–76.
284 Id. at 278.
285 Mallaby, supra note 20.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id.
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portions to private parties and investors and collecting revenues from such leases.291
The investors could build on the land, own the structures they built or rent or sell
them as they wish.292 Initially, legislators used language in the Honduran Constitu-
tion to authorize the creation of Special Development Regions.293 Honduras then
chose a 1,000 square kilometer plot of land to establish a charter city but an indige-
nous group opposed the plan on grounds that the land belonged to them.294 The
Supreme Court of the Republic of Mauritius, a small African island nation that is in
the British Commonwealth, consented to serve as an appellate court for the RED’s
courts, which would apply the common law.295 Cases that further appeal holdings
issued by the Supreme Court of Mauritius could be heard by the Privy Council in
the United Kingdom,296 an arrangement that would bestow a sense of legitimacy and
impartiality to RED courts.297
This arrangement did not come into fruition, and because of internal struggles
in Honduras, the justices on the Honduran Supreme Court who had held the RED
laws unconstitutional298 were removed and a different law called the ZEDE was
enacted to rectify potential Constitutional infirmities.299 The ZEDE legislation was
vehemently opposed by Honduran municipalities, “which feared competition from
the new entities,” even though those municipalities could themselves become ZEDES
and get all the attendant advantages.300 The new President of Honduras emphasized
that ZEDE charter cities would not be run as a “race to the bottom” zone where in-
vestors came merely for cheap labor, but rather would be model cities that also offered
a host of other real benefits, including four critical factors referred to as LEAP factors:
legal, economic, administrative, and political.301 Unlike prior SEZs that are primarily
291 See Miller, supra note 65, at 277.
292 See id.
293 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPUBLICA Jan. 20 1982, art. 329 (Hond.), translated
in Honduras’s Constitution of 1982 with Amendments Through 2013, CONSTITUTE PROJECT
(July 31, 2018), https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Honduras_2013.pdf?long=en
[https://perma.cc/3YE9-PPKN] (“The state promotes economic and social development, which
must be subject to strategic planning. The law shall regulate the system and process of planning
with the participation of the state powers, and political, economic and social organizations shall
be duly represented.”).
294 ECONOMIST, Hong Kong in Honduras, supra note 63; Phillips, supra note 246.
295 FULLER & ROMER, supra note 38, at 11.
296 See Owen Bowcott & Maya Wolfe-Robinson, Honduras May Appeal to London Courts,
GUARDIAN (July 22, 2012, 11:36 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/jul/22/honduras
-london-courts [https://perma.cc/5ALK-5YF7].
297 See FULLER & ROMER, supra note 38, at 11.
298 Constitutional infirmities were related to provisions that granted too much authority to
the REDs, causing concerns about Honduran sovereignty. Miller, supra note 65, at 298–99.
299 Id.
300 Bell, Startup City Redux, supra note 239.
301 Inaugurating New President, Honduras Prepares Special Zones to Offer Investors and
Workers World Standards for Rule of Law, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 26, 2014, 6:58 AM), http://
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focused on special economic rules, the ZEDE aims to achieve what law and develop-
ment practitioners and scholars have advocated for years: “rule of law, efficiency,
security, and transparency.”302 ZEDE touts itself as offering advantages that are unique
to the Central American Free Trade Agreement region, such as “[i]nternational legal
standards, dispute resolution mechanisms and institutions, using Common Law,
mandatory arbitration, and special judges.”303
Under the ZEDE, which was enacted following a constitutional amendment
known as the ZEDE Amendment,304 Honduras was authorized to create zones that
are exempt from, or supplement, Honduras’s laws and judicial system with special laws
and courts,305 except in the areas of international relations.306 Note that the ZEDE
Amendment, though radical in creating comprehensive special zones, take care to
ensure that Honduran territoriality remains intact and unquestioned in order to
preempt criticism based on constitutional-infirmity grounds.307 Therefore, it is im-
portant to note that the ZEDEs do not create, as often claimed, Honduran-free space
subject to the radical will of foreign investors.308 Rather, ZEDEs are subject to the
Constitution of Honduras except in cases where certain constitutional provisions
have been amended to be inapplicable to ZEDE zones.309 For example, ZEDEs are
subject to Articles 11, 12, 13, 15, and 19 of the Constitution, which deal with, among
other items, the inalienability of Honduran territorial integrity, sovereignty, and in-
dependence.310 Articles 8 and 41 of the ZEDE Statute state that laws in the ZEDE
www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/inaugurating-new-president-honduras-prepares-special
-zones-to-offer-investors-and-workers-world-standards-for-rule-of-law-242128401.html [https://
perma.cc/3AME-ZEZJ].
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Decreto No. 236-2012, Diario Oficial de la República de Honduras [La Gaceta] 2013,
http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/hon131571.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3GE-PL7C], translated
in Honduras’s Constitution of 1982 with Amendments Through 2013, CONSTITUTE PROJECT
(July 31, 2013), http://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Honduras_2013.pdf?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/RL9D-MLAV] [hereinafter ZEDE Amendment]. Article 329 of the ZEDE
Amendment specifically states that ZEDEs are subject to those provisions of the Constitution
of Honduras. Id. art. 329.
305 The ZEDE Amendment added this language to Article 303 of the Constitution: “The
judicial branch consists of a Supreme Court of Justice, the Court of Appeals, the courts, by tri-
bunals with exclusive competence in special regimes, . . . and additional offices specified by
law.” Id. art. 303.
306 Miller, supra note 65, at 287.
307 Id. at 288–89.
308 Id. at 302–03.
309 ZEDE Statute, supra note 152, art. 8, Decreto No. 120-2013.
310 CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA, Jan. 20, 1982, art. 11 (Hon.) (providing for the pa-
rameters involved in determining the extent of Honduras’s territory); id. art. 12 (providing
for State sovereignty of airspace, subsoil, territorial seas, continental shelf, and similar areas);
id. art. 13 (providing that the territory of the State is inalienable); id. art. 15 (incorporating
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are subject to the following sources of authority: the Honduran Constitution; treaties
that Honduras has ratified; the ZEDE Statute; Honduran laws that relate to the na-
tional anthem, the flag, and other national symbols; Honduran laws respecting the
territorial sea and contiguous zone; Honduran criminal laws, unless they have been
superseded by the ZEDE laws, particularly those dealing with drug and human
trafficking, money laundering, genocide, terrorism, child pornography, and child ex-
ploitation; and all internal regulations issued by the ZEDE.311
Nonetheless, ZEDEs are unique in that they are created as “autonomous municipal-
ities administered by corporations,” as stated in Article 1 of the ZEDE Amendment,
which amended Article 294 of the Honduras Constitution.312 Autonomy means that
ZEDEs also are required to have their own internal security apparatus, including
police, criminal investigation bodies, criminal prosecution, and prison system.313
There are built-in protections that are provided in the ZEDE Amendment.314 The aim
of ZEDE is “to realize the function of promoting economic and social development,”
as stated in Article 329.315 In pursuit of this goal while simultaneously minimizing
displacement of current inhabitants, Article 1 of the ZEDE Amendment amends Arti-
cle 329 of the Honduras Constitution to allow the application of special ZEDE laws
to zones in Honduras with low population density, such as rural zones.316 Article 1
of the ZEDE Amendment also requires that residents participate in a plebiscite
approved by two-thirds within the proposed zone, unless the zone at issue has a pop-
ulation density lower than the average population density for rural areas.317 Article
1 also grants legal status to ZEDEs, with the capability to incur obligations and sign
contracts as well as possess functional and administrative autonomy with the duties
and powers of ordinary municipalities.318
To insulate the judicial system from tampering and corruption, Article 1 of the
ZEDE Amendment grants the power of judicial appointment to the Judicial Council
or Council of the Judicature, not Congress.319 Article 1 also states that ZEDE courts
may mandate arbitration, as well as adopt foreign laws and traditions, as long as they
international law and providing for enforceability of international arbitral and judicial awards);
id. art. 19 (criminalizing as treason violations of territorial integrity, sovereignty, or inde-
pendence of the Republic).
311 ZEDE Statute, supra note 152, art. 8, 41.
312 ZEDE Amendment, supra note 304, art. 1.
313 ZEDE Statute, supra note 152, art. 22.
314 ZEDE Amendment, supra note 304, art. 1.
315 Id.
316 Id. (amending Article 329 of the Constitution to allow for ZEDE, applying special pro-
visions to ZEDEs with low population density).
317 ZEDE Statute, supra note 152, art. 45 (requiring a referendum or plebiscite for people
living in the area if the population exceeds 100,000).
318 ZEDE Amendment, supra note 304, art. 1.
319 Id.
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meet international human rights standards or provide more protection than the
Honduran system.320
Article 15 of the ZEDE Statute provides for the appointment of ZEDE judges
from a list of candidates proposed by the Committee for the Adoption of Best Prac-
tices.321 Article 14 of the ZEDE Statute recognizes that ZEDEs are special jurisdic-
tions and thus would have “autonomous and independent courts with exclusive
competence in all instances on matters that are not subject to binding arbitration.”322
“Articles 14–15 of the [ZEDE Statute] authorize the creation of courts having
special and exclusive jurisdiction, operated under the common law or Anglo-Saxon
tradition” and “staffed by judges appointed by the judicial counsel of the Honduran
judiciary from a list of candidates provided by the CABP,” otherwise known as the
“Committee on the Adoption of Best Practices.”323 Article 18 of the ZEDE Statute
grants ZEDE courts jurisdiction over matters in equity or at law.324 Decisions by
ZEDE courts “constitute binding precedent,” and if permitted by the Committee for
the Adoption of Best Practices, ZEDE courts may also use precedents from other
jurisdictions or foreign law.325 The ZEDE Statute also mandates that ZEDE courts
are to exercise their functions independently.326 “It also affirms, however, that parties
under ZEDE law ‘may contractually agree to submit [their dispute] to arbitration or
a jurisdiction different from the ZEDE.’”327
ZEDEs also have a Court for Protection of Individual Rights to protect ZEDE in-
habitants against violations; judges on such courts are appointed by the Committee for
the Adoption of Best Practices.328 Article 16 of the ZEDE Statute also provides that ap-
peals from final judgments of such courts can be made to “international tribunals.”329
What is additionally new and different about the Honduran ZEDE Statute is the
fact that it specifically envisions other forms of charter cities, not just the conventional
investment-centered kinds. Article 2 states that the ZEDE zones can take on a variety
of forms, including “International Financial Centers, International Logistics Centers,
Autonomous Cities, International Business Courts, Special Investment Districts, Re-
newable Energy Districts, Special Economic Zones, . . . Special Agribusiness Areas,
Special Tourism Zones, Mining Association Areas, Forest Association Areas,” or
any combination thereof.330 This provision leaves open the possibility that ZEDEs
320 Id.
321 ZEDE Statute, supra note 152, art. 15.
322 Id. art. 14.
323 Bell, Startup City Redux, supra note 239.
324 ZEDE Statute, supra note 152, art. 18.
325 Id.
326 Id. art. 19.
327 Bell, Startup City Redux, supra note 239.
328 ZEDE Statute, supra note 152, art. 16.
329 Id.
330 Id. art. 2.
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can be created to experiment with different development objectives, including noneco-
nomic, pro-refugee zones discussed above, in which special ZEDE laws are imple-
mented to attract refugees who would otherwise be languishing in refugee camps.331
In such an unconventional experiment as charter cities where sovereignty seems
to be relinquished in favor of corporate governance, it is also important to note that
ZEDEs contain numerous protections that are, at least on paper, reassuring for those
concerned about basic human rights. Article 9 of the ZEDE Statute mandates equal
rights and freedom from discrimination within ZEDEs.332 Article 10 guarantees consti-
tutional and international human rights protection, referring to “universal moral princi-
ples.”333 Article 33 states that ZEDEs “are allowed to establish their own systems of
education, health, social security, and promotion of science,” and at the same time
also “guarantee freedom of conscience, religion, labor protection, and freedom of
association.”334 Article 35 emphasizes labor protections, obligating compliance with
standards set by the International Labor Organization and other labor treaties ratified
by Honduras.335 Article 36 provides that all employers in the ZEDE must ensure that
at least ninety percent of their workforce are Honduran nationals, who must receive at
least eighty-five percent of wages ZEDE companies pay.336 Article 41 imposes criminal
sanctions on human trafficking, genocide, terrorism, exploitation of the child, and
organized crime.337 And Article 43 guarantees property-rights protection for indigenous
peoples and descendants of escaped slaves such as the Garifuna.338 ZEDEs are
encouraged to work with such groups on collaborative and respectful terms.339
At the same time, it should be emphasized that the ZEDE Statute does not
provide for transition to democracy but instead envisions that ZEDE zones will be
governed by a body of appointed overseers and an individual possessing both
executory and legislative power.340 The ZEDE zone is governed by a Committee of
twenty-one members responsible for the Adoption of Best Practices.341 These mem-
bers are supposed to be “persons of recognized integrity, leadership, executive capa-
city, and international reputation in the private or nonprofit sector, in academia, or
in the public sector.”342 They are appointed by the President of Honduras and ratified
331 Chris Campbell, Refugee Crisis Solved: Free Havens, LASSIEZ FAIRE (Aug. 1, 2016),
https://lfb.org/refugee-crisis-solved-free-havens [https://perma.cc/J7JN-NT54] (discussing
“free havens” as a potential solution to the refugee crisis).
332 ZEDE Statute, supra note 152, art. 1.
333 Id. art. 10.
334 Id. art. 33.
335 Id. art. 35.
336 Id. art. 36.
337 Id. art. 41.
338 Id. art. 43.
339 Id.
340 Id. art. 11.
341 Id.
342 Id.
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by the National Congress.343 The twenty-one member ZEDE committee then ap-
points a five-member standing committee responsible for day-to-day operations.344
The ZEDE committee has many responsibilities, including establishing policy
guidelines particularly for domestic policy and transparency; providing a list of ten
recommended judges to the Judicial Council to fill vacancies on ZEDE courts; plan-
ning ZEDE expansion; hiring an internationally recognized audit firm to audit zone
functions; and most importantly, working with the Technical Secretary—the highest
executive and legal representative of the ZEDE—who functions as the equivalent
of a governor.345 The ZEDE committee is tasked with the most important task of ap-
pointing and removing the Technical Secretary,346 and overseeing—including approv-
ing or disapproving—his actions and conduct.347
The Technical Secretary must be a Honduran national by birth, and recognized
as someone with “integrity, ability. and merit sufficient for the office entrusted to
him.”348 He serves a term of seven years which is renewable as well as revocable.349
He also has executive and legislative functions.350 For example, Article 12(6) states that
the Technical Secretary is to enact legislation for the ZEDE and submit it for approval
or disapproval by the ZEDE Committee.351 He also executes and applies ZEDE rules
pursuant to Article 12(7).352 Under Article 12(4), the Technical Secretary is also
tasked with management duties, and under Article 12(8), is able to appoint ad hoc
secretaries to assist with the administration of ZEDEs.353 There is no provision in the
ZEDE that calls for either the Technical Secretary or the Standing Committee to be
subject to democratic elections.354 The authority to make law remains vested in one
person, with ratification authority vested in the Standing Committee.355
With respect to finances, Article 23 of the ZEDE Statute states that ZEDEs shall
have their own “separate financial scheme,” in which financial revenues will be used
exclusively for their own purposes, yet may also be subject to transfer “to authorities
in the rest of the country.”356 Article 23 also requires a balanced budget and that
ZEDEs “avoid deficits.”357 The official ZEDE mandate is “a policy of low taxes,”
343 Id. art. 11(10).
344 Id.
345 Id. art. 11–12.
346 Id. art. 11(3).
347 Id. art. 11(2), (5).
348 Id. art. 12.
349 Id.
350 Id.
351 Id. art. 12(6).
352 Id. art. 12(7).
353 Id. art. 12(4), 12(8).
354 See id. art. 11, 12.
355 Miller, supra note 65, at 291–92.
356 ZEDE Statute, supra note 152, art. 23.
357 Id.
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which means that if levied, they cannot exceed specified rates as stated in Article 29.358
For example, there can be no more than a twelve-percent tax on individual income,
a sixteen-percent tax on business income, and a five-percent sales or value-added
tax.359 Article 30 prohibits the imposition of currency-exchange controls or any re-
straints on capital inflow and outflow, specifically providing that currencies that
circulate within ZEDEs are to be “freely convertible.”360 Article 31 prohibits restric-
tions on trade, and favors free trade and competition, with guarantees for the movement
of goods and capital.361 Article 32 provides that imports are to enter ZEDE zones with-
out taxes, tariffs, fees, or any other charges.362 It also specifies that twelve percent of all
tax revenues be deposited in trusts to benefit different branches of the Honduran
government363—for example, to strengthen the judiciary; establish community proj-
ects as designated by the National Congress; promote development, infrastructure,
and security in accordance with guidelines by the ZEDE Technical Secretary; and
strengthen the Honduran military to protect national sovereignty.364 Thus, “[e]ach
zone in the ZEDE system has to contribute to the public 12 percent of all tax reve-
nues it collects.”365 The ZEDE’s authority to impose and collect taxes means that
they are to be fiscally independent, with the power to set their own budget, run their
own services, enter into contracts, and incur their own debt without approval from
the national government.366
If a ZEDE is established in an urban area, the statute provides that it must
recognize private titles to real estate holdings, but that it is also authorized to impose
and collect property taxes payable on the market value of such real estate.367 How-
ever, in rural areas with a low population, the Honduran government acquires the
land, and places the ZEDE in charge of its administration.368 The government is
empowered to expropriate land and pay the owner an amount “based on market ref-
erence values of equal quality real estate outside of the special regime.”369 Arbitra-
tion is the dispute-resolution mechanism for those opposed to expropriation.370 In
cases where title is in dispute, “the compensation value determined by a commission
of experts must be deposited in a trust whose beneficiary is the successful bidder of
358 Id. art. 29.
359 Id.
360 Id. art. 30.
361 Id.
362 Id. art. 32
363 Id. art. 44.
364 Id.
365 BELL, YOUR NEXT GOVERNMENT?, supra note 42, at 53.
366 ZEDE Statute, supra note 152, art. 4, 23.
367 Id. art. 24.
368 Id. art. 25.
369 Id.
370 Id. art. 28.
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the right to compensation in accordance with the relevant judgment.”371 If ZEDEs
are established in areas where there is a prior claim to ownership, whether via in-
formal norms or via the official titling system, the question of valuation and com-
pensation of property becomes of primary importance.
To ensure stability of ZEDEs, Article 45 of the ZEDE states that in accordance
with Article 329 of the Constitution, the ZEDE Act can be modified, interpreted,
amended or repealed only by two-thirds of Congress.372
II. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
As the preceding section demonstrates, the fact that ZEDEs are autonomous re-
gions with their own policies, regulations, and courts has led to concerns that ZEDEs
are privatized zones with a neocolonial whiff.373 Critics are concerned that ZEDEs
will pursue a “shock doctrine” policy of “development controlled by the domestic
and international elite whose investments have impoverished them for centuries.
They worr[y] that the ZEDEs will go even further—stripping them of the most basic
rights and protections they possess as Honduran citizens.”374 Although today’s
charter cities do not approximate the level of domination imposed by the Dutch in
East India, the French in Indochina, and the British in Hong Kong, it is also impor-
tant to recognize that in each of these empires it was not only physical coercion that
was used to dominate indigenous groups. Although Honduran ZEDEs currently do
not provide for foreign partners acting as guarantors, under Romer’s original vision,
host countries are encouraged to partner with foreign partners in order to boost the
credibility of the host.375 Indeed, some already have raised concerns regarding dis-
proportionate bargaining power between developing countries and even foreign
government guarantors or businesses entering into agreements with them.376 Simi-
larly, one could also conceive of a charter city in which a foreign partner, or perhaps
a transparency commission, would be able to dominate the policies of a charter city.
A reasonable response to these concerns is that the ZEDE Statute was estab-
lished to allow the government of Honduras to charter special cities, and as such,
371 Id.
372 Id. art. 45.
373 See supra notes 147–52 and accompanying text.
374 Lauren Carasik, Hondurans Don’t Need Yet Another Neoliberal Boondoggle, AL JAZEERA
AM. (July 20, 2014, 7:45 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/7/honduras-neo
liberaleconomicdevelopmentcorruptionviolence.html [https://perma.cc/AZH9-AT6A].
375 See supra notes 211, 277–79 and accompanying text.
376 E.g., Thierry Ogier, Concerns Over China’s ‘Asymmetric Bargaining Power’, GLOBAL
CAP. (Sept. 24, 2011), https://www.globalcapital.com/article/yvxl42jq2swg/concerns-over-chi
nas-asymmetric-bargaining-power [https://perma.cc/9ST9-NLAA] (“Some feel that African
governments are not as capable as negotiating as the Chinese, so that they may end up getting
a deal that is not necessarily in their favour [sic]. But I think that is a question of the negotiation.
If we can help improve or strengthen the bargaining power of African governments, that would
be in their interest.”).
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this is “an act of law rather than force”377 in which the sovereign, realizing its limita-
tions and inability to jump-start development, granted certain control over its territory
to a ZEDE. Hence, “the voluntary nature of the undertaking”378 combined with the
fact that the creation of the charter itself—even if it results in a diminution of Honduran
sovereignty—is itself a legitimate exercise of sovereignty. In this way, one can say
that a charter city is not the same as:
an international trusteeship, created by, and deriving its authority
from the writ of the international community, which authorizes
the intervention with a view to protecting vulnerable populations
and remedying state failure. As such, we can say that a charter
city embodies the concept of sovereignty whereas a trusteeship
embodies a derogation of the same.379
As Romer put it:
charter cities are based entirely on voluntary actions. Only a
country that wants to establish a charter city will do so. Only
people who want to live and work under the rules specified in
the city’s charter will move there. Free choice is essential for the
legitimacy of the rules in a charter city. It is also what makes a
charter city very different from colonial occupation.380
To ensure that free choice is paramount, Romer’s vision emphasizes that charter
cities cannot be established under conditions involving foreign troops.381 Thus, a
country such as Haiti would not be a good candidate for the establishment of charter
cities because of the pre-existence of foreign troops already on Haitian soil; in this
case, the project would resemble “a humanitarian military occupation. This approach
is fraught with risks that the concept of a charter city is designed to avoid.”382
Second, because the very appeal of charter cities is founded on the export of a
particular version of economic and political principles that are dominant in the West,
critics are concerned that the project’s assumptions are taken for granted, without
critical reflection.383 Terms such as “rule of law” or “good governance” are used as
if they are apolitical, technocratic, and neutral terms:
377 Rahul Sagar, Are Charter Cities Legitimate?, 24 J. POL. PHIL. 509, 511 (2016).
378 Id. at 510.
379 Id. at 511.
380 CTR. GLOB. DEV., supra note 166.
381 Paul Romer, Charter Cities Versus Humanitarian Military Interventions, MARRON
INST. URB. MGMT. (Jan. 17, 2010), http://marroninstitute.nyu.edu/blog/charter-cities-versus
-humanitarian-military-occupation [https://perma.cc/T76T-U5Y6].
382 Id.
383 See, e.g., Carasik, supra note 374.
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The virtues of good governance are apparently self-evident. But
the meaning of the terms remains open and contestable and these
institutions attempted to use an amended version of human
rights law to further their neoliberal policies in the guise of
“good governance,”rather than enabling real empowerment of
Third World citizens.384
ZEDEs certainly do embody a particular vision of development that is politically,
not merely technocratically, grounded.
Honduran ZEDEs are also not democratic because there are no elections in the
ZEDEs.385 The gestalt of ZEDEs is defined by the technocratic dimensions of develop-
ment, instead of the political dimensions, which are messier and more contested.386
Of course, the very fact that ZEDEs are meant to bypass local and national politics
is itself part of the appeal. Democracy is in the realm of politics and as such, ZEDEs
bypass democracy as there are no democratic elections promised or held in Honduran
ZEDEs.387 Neither Romer’s vision nor the Honduran ZEDEs require a commitment
to “multi-party, electoral democracy.”388
Critics are thus concerned about “the anti-democratic control of foreign corpo-
rate interests,”389 and have warned of “authoritarian governance.”390 The obvious
democratic deficit is a cause of concern, and questions arise over whether this deficit
can be compatible with liberal democratic norms. The central issue here is whether
legitimacy can only be found in structures that are infused with liberal democratic
norms. The age-old question about democratic legitimacy is especially relevant for
charter cities run by investors who are not democratically elected. As one commen-
tator put it, “[t]he conventional view, which hardly needs elaboration, is that in view
of the equality and autonomy of individuals a regime is legitimate only when those
over whom it rules have consented to be subject to its laws and commands.”391
What institutional safeguards regarding consent must exist and be implemented
before charter cities can be deemed legitimate? For Romer, consent is foundational.392
384 Antony Anghie, The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities,
27 THIRD WORLD Q. 739, 749 (2006).
385 See supra notes 311–26 and accompanying text.
386 See supra notes 219–22 and accompanying text.
387 See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
388 Sagar, supra note 377, at 513.
389 Belen Fernandez, Partitioning Honduras: The Advent of Charter Cities, AL JAZEERA
(July 14, 2012), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/07/2012711121224166933
.html [https://perma.cc/2K2A-BY6C].
390 Annie Bird, Privately Owned “Charter Cities” in Honduras: Entire Urban Areas Handed
over to Corporations, GLOBAL RES. (Sept. 15, 2012), https://www.globalresearch.ca/privately
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[https://perma.cc/KM3Z-G5NL].
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2019] CHARTER CITIES 759
As John Locke observed, “[m]en being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal,
and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political
power of another, without his own consent.”393 Even David Hume, often regarded
as posing pragmatic opposition to Locke’s position on consent, argued:
My intention here is not to exclude the consent of the people
from being one just foundation of government. Where it has
place, it is surely the best and most sacred of any. I only contend
that it has very seldom had place in any degree, and never al-
most in its full extent, and that, therefore, some other foundation
of government must also be admitted.394
Romer’s model includes principles intended to ease exit by allowing citizens
freely to opt in or out of the charter city—a manifestation of consent theory in prac-
tice.395 There must be “choice, backed by both voluntary entry and free exit for all
residents, employers, and investors.”396 Further, the model suggests providing citizens
with a demonstrable set of promises regarding governance within the charter city.397
As we have seen, ZEDEs include provisions to ensure the independence and neutral-
ity of the judiciary, and there is no provision that would restrict the free movement
of people in or out of the zones.398 Thus, it would seem that Romer’s proposal in-
cludes several mechanisms for creating a more consent-rich system of governance. For
example, Bell explains that “[i]n the real world, of course, freedom of exit comes
only by degrees.”399 Similarly, Albert Hirschman argued that “[a]s a rule . . . loyalty
holds exit at bay and activates voice.”400 This would likely have posed a particular
issue for citizens in the RED who would have had little outlet for exercising voice
because authority to elect individuals did not immediately vest in citizens.401 Stated
simply, Bell demonstrates that consent and government justification are more aptly
described in degrees rather than in terms of presence or absence.402
393 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 95 (J. W. Gough ed.,
1948) (1689).
394 David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in 1 ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY
49, 51 (University of Chicago Press, 1987) (1752) (emphasis added).
395 FULLER AND ROMER, supra note 38, at 7.
396 Id.
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398 See supra notes 291–97, 303–05 and accompanying text.
399 Tom W. Bell, Graduated Consent in Contract and Tort Law: Toward a Theory of Jus-
tification, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 17, 64 (2010) [hereinafter Bell, Graduated Consent].
400 Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obli-
gations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 433, 433 (2009) (quoting ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND
LOYALTY 78 (1970)) (alterations in original).
401 ECONOMIST, Hong Kong in Honduras, supra note 63.
402 Bell, Graduated Consent, supra note 399, at 63 (“Recognizing that consent comes by
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Thus, from even a fundamentally pragmatic approach, the substantial value of con-
sent as it relates to governance is well recognized. However, Hume’s assertion demon-
strates the difficulty sometimes inherent in identifying consent, and even greater, the
relative degree of such consent.403 In law, one can think of consent not just in terms
of approval or disapproval but also in terms of relative degrees of consent or uncon-
sent.404 Consent can be broken down into express, implied, or hypothetical consent;
the former two being differentiated by forms of expression, and the latter being based
on a presumption.405 In contract law, for example, express consent relies on some form
of communicative act, and can be broken down into two additional categories—
negotiated exchanges and standardized exchanges.406 Alternatively, implied consent
generally binds an individual failing to object to a default rule expressly, and includes
three types, each embedded by implication.407 Hypothetical consent is based on what
an individual would have done without regard to his actual preference and includes two
types.408 Essentially, unconsent involves the same relative categories regarding expres-
sions and presumptions that an individual does or does not consent.409 Even in these
terms, the various categories themselves cannot be viewed categorically, but are a
matter of degrees.410
An in-depth discussion on the nature of consent in political systems is beyond the
scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that many scholars have observed that few
regimes satisfy consent theory, that consent is indeed a matter of degrees, and even
that democracies can be seen as failures given deeply embedded social and political
inequalities which cast doubt on political participation.411 Indeed, even in liberal
403 See Hume, supra note 394, at 51.
404 Bell, Graduated Consent, supra note 399, at 19–21.
405 Id. at 34.
406 Id. at 34, 36 (“In addition, contract law recognizes a distinction between dickered and
form agreements, treating negotiated exchanges with more respect than standardized ones.
Express consent thus includes two subtypes: consent to negotiated exchanges and consent
to standardized exchanges.” (citation omitted)).
407 Id. at 34, 37–38 (“Contract law recognizes subtle shadings within implied consent, dis-
tinguishing between terms implied by performance under the agreement, terms implied by past
dealings between the parties, and terms implied by usage in the trade.” (citations omitted)).
408 Id. at 34, 39 (“Universal hypothetical consent proves easier to establish, and weaker in
effect, than hypothetical consent premised on what a particular individual would have done.”
(citation omitted)).
409 Id. at 34, 40.
410 Id. at 44 (“In fuzzier but more practical terms, the scale of consent affords a rough mea-
sure of how justified we regard a particular transaction. For instance, we typically treat an
expressly consensual transaction as justified, not only respecting its terms, as when tort law
treats consent as a defense to battery, but often even helping to enforce them, as when con-
tract law imposes expectation damages for breach.”).
411 Id. at 64; Sagar, supra note 377, at 517 (“A number of scholars, including John Simmons,
Allen Buchanan, and Russell Hardin, have pointed out that few, if any, regimes can satisfy
consent theory because social and political inequalities raise a question mark over the quality
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democratic states such as the United States, the low turnout in elections has called
into question the meaning of democratic consent.412 For example, the Pew Research
Center ranked the United States—with a fifty-three percent voting rate in 2012 and
thirty-six percent voting rate in 2014—a low thirty-first out of thirty-five countries
for voter turnout among countries that make up the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development.413
This issue of what form of government is legitimate has been a source of debate
among democracy scholars. The point here is merely to observe that serious debate
exists among scholars on the question of legitimacy and democracy, and that this
debate is particularly relevant in the context of charter cities, given their deliberately
nondemocratic character. Professor Buchanan, for example, observed that political
systems that are not liberal democratic can still be legitimate if they prevent slip-
pages into anarchy, and if there are “minimal standards for protecting individual’s
rights by processes and policies that are themselves at least minimally just and is not
a usurper.”414 For Buchanan, however, full legitimacy can only be attained once the
system has laid the foundations for a transition to democracy.415 Others such as John
Rawls believe that not all societies have to be democratic if they opt for a different
system, and the principle of self-determination should serve to insulate such societ-
ies from criticism, as long as the society at issue is “decent”—that is, respects basic
rights, consults with its citizens, pursues the common good as that society defines
it, and allows political dissent.416 Other accounts of legitimacy rest on systems of
government that, though nondemocratic, can produce “more desirable consequences
than any plausible alternative could.”417 These systems of government, though non-
democratic, would be judged based on what has been commonly referred to as
“output legitimacy.”418
Plausible indicators of “output legitimacy” may reasonably be found in the United
Nations Human Development Reports, which track development-related data such
as per capita income, infant mortality, literacy, and life expectancy.419 Hong Kong
of consent that citizens can offer, and moral and political differences lead to disagreement
over what is reasonable for citizens to even hypothetically consent to.”).
412 Bell, Graduated Consent, supra note 399, at 57 n.192.
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414 Sagar, supra note 377, at 517 (quoting Allen Buchanan, Political Legitimacy and Demo-
cracy, 112 ETHICS 689, 718–19 (2002)).
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and Singapore, for example, are top examples of nondemocratic systems that none-
theless, are largely devoid of grave abuses, do a very decent job of safeguarding
basic rights, and provide economic well-being to their citizens.420
Charter cities therefore are defensible despite their nondemocratic character if
they meet the legitimacy indicators described above.421 The provisions of ZEDE
regulations guarantee rule of law and observance of basic rights such as those
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.422 There are built-in pro-
tective mechanisms designed to ensure adherence to basic international human rights
norms, as noted.
Other legitimacy concerns have rested on the presence of foreign investors, or
in some cases foreign guarantors (under Romer’s original model).423 This concern
is understandable given the history of colonialism in the Third World. But as Rahul
Sagar observed, the main issue should be not on the presence of foreign involvement
but the consequences of such involvement “as measured by widely endorsed mea-
sures of governance.”424 If foreign involvement does not create positive results, but
rather, for example:
we see a charter city doling out lucrative policing contracts to the
same guarantor but witness little or no reduction in crime rates—
then we would have reason to wonder whether the choice to
involve foreigners was in fact the product of free choice (or if it
was in fact the product of bribery or subtle forms of coercion).425
History is replete with examples of positive foreign involvement, particularly
when host countries delegate certain functions to foreign actors. One example is the
2003 delegation agreement between the Solomon Islands and Australia in which
Australian soldiers, pursuant to the Australian Regional Assistance Mission, partici-
pated in establishing the rule of law in the Islands before leaving ten years later.426
Professor Sagar pointed to other examples, such as the Genoan response to internal
factionalization, which bypassed gridlock by outsourcing the administration of the
city to a non-Genoese chief magistrate.427 More recently, to access international
420 See, e.g., Hong Kong, China (SAR): Human Development Factors, U.N. DEV. PRO-
GRAMME, http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/HGK [https://perma.cc/9CRZ-6FZ6];
Singapore: Human Development Factors, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, http://hdr.undp.org/en
/countries/profiles/SGP [https://perma.cc/RZ6K-2EWU].
421 See Sagar, supra note 377, at 510.
422 Miller, supra note 65, at 288.
423 Sagar, supra note 377, at 510.
424 Id. at 523.
425 Id.
426 Id. at 524.
427 Id.
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capital markets, the Ottoman Empire was willing to rely on foreign experts to staff
the Ottoman Public Debt Administration because foreign presence was an assurance
to debtors that loans would be efficiently serviced.428 Another historical example of
foreign involvement in the administration of local institutions can be found during
the Qing Dynasty, in which the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, tasked with
collecting revenues from overseas trade, was primarily staffed by the British after
Qing Dynasty officials were deemed unsatisfactory in carrying out their functions.429
So laudable was the performance of the Service that even after the success of the
nationalist-led Chinese Revolution of 1911, it was retained rather than disbanded.430
One way to evaluate foreign involvement is to look at whether there is monopo-
listic or self-dealing behavior on the part of the foreign party. Professor Sagar
suggested a strategy of separation of powers as a safeguard mechanism to ensure
division of labor.431 Thus, one foreign country could be involved in helping the host
state with policing, while another country could supervise the judicial system, en-
suring that the law-enforcement function is separated to prevent monopoly, even
sacrificing efficiency if needed.432
Another way to forestall foreign self-dealing or monopoly is through external
audits, as provided for in the ZEDEs, by auditors who are “internationally respected
individuals free from conflicts of interest vis-à-vis the foreign guarantors and cor-
porations involved.”433 The main purpose would be to evaluate the performance of
the foreign guarantor or experts, although Professor Sagar realized that there are
limitations to what the audit board can truly accomplish if there is an “absence of
judicial power,”434 which is not the case for Honduran ZEDEs.
Another safeguard against foreign predatory behavior may be via referendum that
is subject to international supervision. Charter city residents would be empowered,
under this principle, to decide whether to continue the existing charter relationship.435
Sagar suggested that referendums be used in conjunction with international audits
to ensure the integrity of both processes.436 For example, he proposed that referendums
be triggered when there are three successive negative audit reports—a proposal that
would give teeth to auditors whose role might otherwise be purely precatory.437
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CONCLUSION
Charter cities are an intriguing mix of national and international elements, pro-
viding a novel approach to development through the establishment of a city on a
previously undeveloped piece of land or a sparsely populated area. Although charter
cities are subject to the sovereignty of the nation-state that creates them, they are
also special zones that opt out of the conventional understanding of sovereignty—
opting into, instead, a more limited sovereignty restrained by an international charter
governed by certain principles. These principles can vary depending on the type of
zone at issue—zones designed as foreign-investment vehicles, refugee havens,
environmentally “green” areas, or laboratories for legal, economic, administrative,
or political experimentation. Regardless of the type of zone, at the core of each
charter are the principles of freedom of choice and equality.438
This Article has focused on the Honduran special economic development zone,
created to attract investment into a country that is one of the poorest and most violent
in Central America. The Honduran ZEDE Statute stands as an important stepping
stone for Honduras to host various forms of charter cities without being limited to
the conventional investment-centered form. Notably, ZEDEs are not democratic
territories but are instead governed by a body of appointed overseers and an inde-
pendent judicial counsel.439 Consequently, the fact that ZEDEs are autonomous
regions with their own policies and regulations have raised concerns regarding
neocolonialism. Furthermore, critics have also commented on the inherently West-
ern constructs being developed within charter cities, and the consequences to human
rights that result from such constructs.
Ultimately, the ZEDE charter is an act of law rather than force, based on Hondu-
ras’s desire to charter special cities. The voluntary nature of this undertaking
provides a defense for charter cities despite their nondemocratic character, provided
the cities are established through legitimate channels. Furthermore, external audits,
and the preservation of legitimacy through the use of foreign states would address
many of the concerns raised by critics. Thus, the use of charter zones remains an
effective way to bring about necessary development.
438 See Sagar, supra note 377, at 511.
439 See ECONOMIST, Hong Kong in Honduras, supra note 63.
